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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

BEYOND BAKKE: GRUTTER–GRATZ AND THE PROMISE OF
BROWN

JOEL K. GOLDSTEIN*

I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court’s long-awaited decisions this past summer in the
Michigan affirmative action cases provided yet another landmark in the
continuing controversy regarding race and education. A quarter century,
almost to the day, after the Court handed down its badly splintered decision in
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,1 the Court again concluded
that universities may sometimes, but not always, give some preference to racial
and ethnic minorities in deciding whom to admit. The Court, in a 5-4 decision
in Grutter v. Bollinger, upheld the constitutionality of the University of
Michigan Law School’s admission policy that considered race as one factor
among many in achieving a diverse student body.2 It concluded that student
body diversity was a compelling interest that justified using a racial
classification and that the Law School’s admissions program, which avoided
any formulaic approach, was narrowly tailored to that end.3 In the companion
case, Gratz v. Bollinger, the Court held that the University of Michigan’s
undergraduate admission program, which awarded minority applicants twenty
percent of the total points needed for admission, violated the Equal Protection
Clause.4 The Court found that, even if diversity was a compelling interest, a
conclusion Grutter imposed, a twenty percent bump based on race was not

* Associate Dean of Faculty and Professor, Saint Louis University School of Law. Thanks to
Saint Louis University School of Law and Dean Jeffrey Lewis for support for this Article and the
conference in which a version was presented. Thanks also to participants at a faculty workshop at
Saint Louis University School of Law for their helpful comments. Conversations with a number
of friends and colleagues helped shape my thinking. These included Eric Claeys, Roger
Goldman, Alan Howard, Dan Hulsebosch, William Nelson, and Dennis Tuchler, some of whom
commented on an earlier draft. Kate Douglas provided superb research assistance and Mary
Dougherty patiently retyped the manuscript. I alone am responsible for any and all shortcomings.
1. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
2. Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2347 (2003).
3. Id. at 2339.
4. Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2417 (2003).
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narrowly tailored.5 The nine justices produced thirteen opinions; only Justice
O’Connor joined both majority opinions.6
As something of a split decision, Grutter-Gratz mirrored, in many respects,
the outcome of Bakke a generation earlier. There, the nine justices produced
six opinions resulting in a decision striking down the admissions program at
University of California Davis Medical School, to the extent that it set aside
sixteen percent of the places for minority applicants, but allowing Davis to use
race or ethnicity to produce a diverse class.7 Five justices thought the quota
invalid, whereas five justices thought race could be considered.8 Only Justice
Powell participated in both majorities. He wrote the decisive opinion for the
Court, but it was an opinion that none of his colleagues joined.9
Grutter-Gratz covered much the same terrain as Bakke had twenty-five
years earlier. Indeed, in Grutter, the University of Michigan School of Law
invoked Bakke at the beginning of the summary of its argument in its brief:
Twenty-five years ago, this Court resolved a bitter national controversy over
the constitutionality of race-conscious admissions policies in its landmark
decision in Bakke. The essential holding of Bakke is that quotas and set-asides
are illegal, but that some attention may be paid to race in the context of a
competitive review of the ways that each applicant will contribute to the
overall diversity of the student body.10

The Law School argued that Bakke was a direct precedent in support of its plan
and urged the Court to rule in its favor on stare decisis grounds.11
Barbara Grutter preferred to claim ancestral ties to an earlier case dealing
with race in America, Brown v. Board of Education.12 Her counsel began his
argument by quoting from the opening argument of Robert J. Carter before the

5. Id. at 2427-28.
6. Six justices wrote opinions in Grutter: Justice O’Connor (majority opinion), Justice
Ginsburg (concurring), Justice Scalia (concurring in part and dissenting in part), Justice Thomas
(concurring in part and dissenting in part), Chief Justice Rehnquist (dissenting), and Justice
Kennedy (dissenting). Seven justices wrote opinions in Gratz: Chief Justice Rehnquist (majority
opinion), Justice O’Connor (concurring), Justice Thomas (concurring), Justice Breyer
(concurring), Justice Souter (dissenting), Justice Ginsburg (dissenting), and Justice Stevens
(dissenting).
7. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 271-72 (1978).
8. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Powell, Stevens, Stewart, and Burger thought the
quota was invalid, and Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Powell felt that race
should be considered.
9. Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun joined sections I and V-C of Justice
Powell’s opinion, the statement of facts and order reversing the state court decision that race and
ethnicity could not be considered. Justice White also joined section III-A, arguing that strict
scrutiny was the appropriate standard.
10. Brief for Respondent at 12, Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003) (No. 02-241).
11. Id.
12. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2004]

BEYOND BAKKE

901

Court on behalf of the plaintiffs in Brown in 1953. “We have one fundamental
contention which we will seek to develop in the course of this argument,” he
said, “and that contention is that no state has any authority under the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to use race as a factor in
affording educational opportunities among its citizens.”13 Fifty years later,
Grutter “ask[ed] the Court to again vindicate the same principle,” that our
Constitution is color-blind.14
Were the decisions in Grutter-Gratz simply a rehash of Bakke? And, does
the Court’s rejection of Barbara Grutter’s argument represent abandonment of
the principle animating Brown?
To each question respectively, the answer is no and no. Even a modest
reading of Grutter-Gratz discloses them as a triumph for those advocating
racial preference in admissions decisions. They averted a disaster that other
cases suggested might be in store. At a minimum, Grutter placed affirmative
action in admissions on much firmer footing than Bakke had left it. Although
many universities had relied on Justice Powell’s opinion in crafting their
policies, some courts questioned its status as a binding precedent.15 Grutter
endorsed Justice Powell’s “view that student body diversity is a compelling
state interest that can justify the use of race in university admissions.”16
Whereas no rationale achieved a majority in Bakke, five justices embraced the
diversity rationale in Grutter as articulated in Justice O’Connor’s opinion.17
Accordingly, institutions of higher education were authorized to continue to
use race as a factor in admissions decisions.
Yet Grutter went well beyond Bakke in critical respects. Justice O’Connor
reviewed the law school’s plan more leniently than conventional applications
of strict scrutiny would suggest. Although Gratz limited the means available
for use in admissions plans, Grutter provided some important flexibility. Yet
Justice O’Connor’s potentially most important contribution was the manner in
which she greatly expanded the rationale supporting the use of race in
admissions decisions. Her defense was far broader than that Justice Powell
had offered a quarter century earlier. She did not confine her discussion to the
narrow version of a student diversity rationale that Justice Powell had
articulated. Instead, she recognized the value of race-conscious admissions in
bringing the United States closer to the dream of a nation of opportunity for all.

13. Brief for Petitioner at 18, Grutter, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (No. 02-241).
14. Id.
15. See, e.g., Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th Cir.
2001); Hopwood v. Texas, 236 F.3d 256, 274-75 (5th Cir. 2000); Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d
932, 944 (5th Cir. 1996). But see Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law Sch., 233 F.3d 1188, 1200-01
(9th Cir. 2000).
16. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2337.
17. Id. at 2339-41.
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Far from repudiating Brown, as Barbara Grutter’s argument would imply,
Grutter vindicated Brown. Brown’s central message was not the
impermissibility of using race as a criterion for decisions, as Grutter suggested.
Rather, it was that race could not be used to foreclose minorities, particularly
blacks, from sharing in the American dream. That chord resonates powerfully
in Grutter as well.
In many respects, it was Bakke, not Grutter, which deviated from Brown.
Justice Powell’s Bakke opinion saved affirmative action in admissions but did
so on a basis that emphasized values of the First, rather than Fourteenth,
Amendment. Justice Powell presented race simply as a means to foster
diversity needs implicit in the First Amendment, not as a problem that America
needed to address.
Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion in Grutter
reintroduced the focus on race in significant respects. She linked those plans
in important ways to addressing America’s racial problems. In doing so, she
drew not only from Justice Powell’s Bakke opinion, but from the quite
different opinion of Justice Marshall.
This Article will begin by briefly outlining central principles of Brown.
Section III will then present Bakke and show how it deviated from those tenets.
Section IV will outline Grutter and Gratz and show how Grutter stretched
doctrine regarding levels of scrutiny and the narrow tailoring of strict scrutiny.
Finally, Section V will focus on Grutter’s main contribution, the expanded
rationale for race preferences.
II. BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION
Brown v. Board of Education occupies an unusual position in the
American legal canon. On the one hand, Brown is “the single most honored
opinion in the Supreme Court’s corpus,”18 a decision whose essential rightness
is not a subject of controversy or even discussion. No one today asserts that
Brown was wrongly decided.19 Indeed, such a position is essentially
unimaginable. On the other hand, the opinion has been extensively critiqued.
Some complain that Chief Justice Warren failed to articulate a sufficient basis
for the ruling,20 that the rationale offered was “uninspired,”21 that the decision

18. Jack M. Balkin, Brown as Icon, in WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD
HAVE SAID 3, 4 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001).
19. But see WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID, supra note 18, at
185-200 (dissent of Derrick A. Bell).
20. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 31-35 (1959) (arguing that the problem with Brown is found in the reasoning of the
opinion).
21. ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 216 (1960).
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rested on shaky psychology rather than customary legal principles,22 that
international imperatives or class motives drove the outcome,23 and that the
decision was rich in symbolism but modest in its impact.24
In Brown, the Court considered whether the doctrine of “separate but
equal” was consistent with the promise of equal protection of the laws. The
doctrine made its way into constitutional law, of course, in 1896, in Plessy v.
Ferguson, where the Court upheld Louisiana’s statutes providing for separate
rail cars for blacks and whites traveling intrastate.25 Plessy had applied a
reasonableness standard against which the Court thought a law authorizing or
requiring racial segregation in public conveyances no “more obnoxious to the
[F]ourteenth [A]mendment than the acts of [C]ongress requiring separate
schools for colored children in the District of Columbia, the constitutionality of
which does not seem to have been questioned, or the corresponding acts of
state legislatures.”26 Indeed, laws establishing separate schools for white and
black children were the “most common instance” of an exercise of state police
power to prevent “commingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to
either.”27 The Court rejected as fallacious the argument “that the enforced
separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a badge of
inferiority.”28 Justice Henry Billings Brown depicted separate-but-equal as a
neutral doctrine that separated, but did not discriminate among, the races.
Wrote Justice Brown: “If this be so, it is not by reason of anything found in the
act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon
it.”29 Justice Brown’s analysis could have been convincing only in a world
hermetically sealed from American history. Quite clearly, separation reflected
a conviction that blacks were unequal to whites.
The plaintiffs in Brown challenged the separate-but-equal doctrine in
public schools—the specific application that Justice Brown had used as the
prop for the doctrine he announced. The Court concluded that “in the field of
public education the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place.”30 The vice
of separate schools related entirely to their impact on African-American
children. Brown removed the issue from a logician’s paradise and returned it
22. See Earl M. Maltz, Brown v. Board of Education, in CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDITIES,
CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES 207 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Sanford Levinson eds.) (1998)
(criticizing Brown as not supported by originalism).
23. See, e.g., MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2000).
24. See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, Brown v. Board of Education: Facts and Political
Correctness, 80 VA. L. REV. 185 (1994).
25. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
26. Id. at 551.
27. Id. at 544.
28. Id. at 551.
29. Id.
30. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
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to the real world. Far from being neutral in its purpose or effect, segregation
enforced by law made clear to African-Americans that they were second-class
citizens, not full members of the American community. “To separate them
from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race
generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may
affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone,” Chief
Justice Warren wrote in the opinion’s most powerful passage.31
In retrospect, Brown stands for two distinct, but related, principles with
continued relevance to modern constitutional discourse. First, Brown
represents the idea that educational opportunity should be open to all. One of
the few paragraphs in Chief Justice Warren’s brief opinion32 discusses the
significance of education. The punch line of the discussion is that when a state
provides education, it “is a right which must be made available to all on equal
terms.”33
To be sure, what “equal terms” entails is a subject of great controversy,
some of which is central to the debate regarding race-sensitive admissions.
Moreover, in some respects, the Court has rejected this norm. For instance, the
Court has held that states may spend widely disproportionate sums to educate
different children depending on whether they live in affluent or distressed areas
without offending the Equal Protection Clause.34 The more instructive inquiry
for present purposes is why the Court thought education was a good that
needed to be distributed impartially.
In Brown, the Court saw education as critical to achieving a “democratic
society” in two respects. First, education was instrumental in fostering civic
performance. “It is required in the performance of our most basic public
responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of
good citizenship,” Chief Justice Warren wrote.35 Second, education was
crucial to making real the American dream that the United States was a land of
opportunity for all. “In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably
be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education,”
he wrote.36 The reverse implication was that with an education any child could
go as far as his ambition and talents would take him. Chief Justice Warren saw

31. Id. at 494.
32. Brown covers just fourteen pages of the U.S. Reports. The first three pages list the
parties and attorneys, the next three and one-half pages state the facts and procedural history, the
next three and one-half pages explain why the original intent of the Fourteenth Amendment is
unclear and summarize past doctrine. The last page announces plans for considering remedial
issues. Only approximately three pages state and justify the decision.
33. Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.
34. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
35. Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.
36. Id.
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the two as related, contributory streams to “our democratic society.”37 Indeed,
the sentence that provided the link between the two ideals began by celebrating
education as the key to civic responsibility (“Today it is a principal instrument
in awakening the child to cultural values”) but, a comma later, invoked its role
in fostering the American dream (“in preparing him for later professional
training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment.”).38
The second principle from Brown grows out of the Court’s explanation as
to why separate-but-equal schools were “inherently unequal.” The Court
thought “intangible considerations,”39 which the Court had found relevant at
the college and graduate level, applied “with added force”40 to black children:
“To separate them from others of similar age and qualifications solely because
of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the
community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be
undone.”41 Chief Justice Warren endorsed the lower court finding in Brown to
the effect that legally mandated segregation adversely impacted the
development of African-American children, in part by stamping them as
inferior.42 Brown suggested that the Equal Protection Clause required America
to take account of and remedy the perception blacks reasonably had of being
excluded. The Constitution required that America stop subjugating AfricanAmericans. Brown embarked America on a journey to undo the vestiges of its
history of racial oppression. The “feeling of inferiority” sentence expressed a
deeper, communitarian notion of how majority groups should treat those
lacking power. It is noteworthy that the Court deemed tangible signs of
equality as insufficient to constitute equal protection so long as segregation
“generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community.”43 It was
striking that the Court emphasized the messages society conveyed to AfricanAmericans as constitutional harms deserving remedy. The law generally does
not recognize “feelings” as subjects of its protection; when it does, it accords
such intangibles secondary protection. The Court’s focus on the “feeling of
inferiority as to . . . status in the community” was accordingly significant in
several respects.
First, the rationale made clear that the Equal Protection Clause speaks not
only to formal equality but also to more ephemeral notions of “status in the
community.” Implicitly, Brown teaches that society should be ordered in such
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. But see Elaine A. Alexander & Lawrence A. Alexander, The New Racism: An
Analysis of the Use of Racial and Ethnic Criteria in Decision-Making, 9 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 190,
235 (1972) (explaining that Brown was inapposite to de facto segregation).
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a way that members of no group would reasonably feel like lesser members of
the community. As such, stigma becomes a constitutionally significant
concept. Second, the rationale suggests that the Equal Protection Clause does
not operate symmetrically for whites and blacks. Significantly, Chief Justice
Warren did not adopt Mr. Carter’s argument regarding the relevancy of race.
Brown avoids any proclamation that the Constitution is color-blind. On the
contrary, its focus is on redressing the impact of the feelings of inferiority from
state-imposed segregation. Chief Justice Warren’s pivotal “feeling of
inferiority” sentence could only have been written about African-American
children in 1954. The sentence would have made no sense in America at that
time in reference to white children.
III. THE JOURNEY TO GRUTTER AND GRATZ
A. Bakke
In many respects, Bakke was an earlier generation’s version of GrutterGratz. Bakke had held invalid the medical school admissions program at
University of California at Davis that set aside sixteen spots for minority
applicants. The four justices44 who joined Justice Powell in striking down the
Davis plan never reached the constitutional issue. Instead, they concluded that
the Davis plan violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Four
justices45 would have upheld the Davis plan that Justice Powell deemed an
unconstitutional quota. Although Justice Powell concluded that the Davis plan
did serve a compelling need in producing a diverse student body, he found that
the University had misconceived “the nature of the state interest that would
justify consideration of race or ethnic background.”46 The valued diversity
“encompasses a far broader array of qualifications and characteristics of which
racial or ethnic origin is but a single though important element.”47 The Davis
plan was not narrowly tailored to meet that need. The Court held, however,
that admissions programs could consider race as a factor in determining which
applicants to accept.48
44. The Justices who joined Justice Powell were Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Stewart,
Rehnquist and Stevens.
45. The Justices who would have upheld the Davis plan were Justices Brennan, White,
Marshall, and Blackmun.
46. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 315 (1978).
47. Id.
48. Justice Powell apparently wanted to affirm the use of race in admissions while striking
down the Davis plan’s set-aside. Nevertheless, he initially intended to cast his decision merely as
affirming the California Supreme Court’s decision. Justice Brennan persuaded him at conference
that the California Supreme Court had also held any use of race invalid and that accordingly,
Justice Powell should cast his decision as reversing the state court in part. Justice Powell quickly
agreed with Justice Brennan’s analysis, thereby allowing Bakke to be depicted as a split decision
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Justice Powell found two intrinsic characteristics in the Equal Protection
Clause. It shielded persons, not groups. And, it applied symmetrically to all
individuals. “The guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one thing when
applied to one individual and something else when applied to a person of
another color. If both are not accorded the same protection, then it is not
equal.”49 These principles required courts to subject all racial classifications to
the same high degree of scrutiny. Justice Powell wrote, “It is far too late to
argue that the guarantee of equal protection to all persons permits the
recognition of special wards entitled to a degree of protection greater than that
accorded others.”50 According to Justice Powell, racial classifications were
suspect whether race was used to harm, or to help, African-Americans. As
such, all racial classifications should receive strict judicial scrutiny.51 They
could only be upheld if the state could show its purpose was “constitutionally
permissible and substantial” and that the classification was necessary to
achieve that end.52
The University had advanced four rationales to support its set-aside.
Justice Powell found that three of the University’s proffered justifications
failed to satisfy strict scrutiny. First, the University had argued that its
program would reduce “‘the historic deficit of traditionally disfavored
minorities in medical schools and in the medical profession.’”53 Justice Powell
rejected this rationale on the grounds that a preference based on race or ethnic
grounds alone was facially invalid,54 at least if it was tied to “some specified
percentage of a particular group.”55

rather than as a defeat for use of race in admissions decisions. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ,
BEHIND BAKKE: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND THE SUPREME COURT 96 (1988). Professor
Schwartz described Justice Powell’s position as a “crucial concession.” Id. In contrast, Justice
Powell’s biographer disputes the characterization: “Brennan’s intervention led Powell to do
exactly what he wanted to do anyway—split the difference between goals and quotas.” JOHN C.
JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 487 (1994).
49. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 289-90.
50. Id. at 295.
51. Id. at 291. Justice White joined this portion of Justice Powell’s opinion. Id. at 387 n.7.
52. Id. at 305.
53. Id. at 306 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 32, Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265 (No. 76-811)).
54. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307. Justice Powell wrote:
If petitioner’s purpose is to assure within its student body some specified percentage of a
particular group merely because of its race or ethnic origin, such a preferential purpose
must be rejected not as insubstantial but as facially invalid. Preferring members of any
one group for no reason other than race or ethnic origin is discrimination for its own sake.
This the Constitution forbids.
Id. Or, as the Ninth Circuit has put it, “[p]ure (or, if you will, impure) percentages used for their
own sake are not proper.” Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law Sch., 233 F.3d 1188, 1197 (9th Cir.
2000). But see Robert M. O’Neil, Racial Preference and Higher Education: The Larger Context,
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The University’s second rationale, “countering the effects of societal
discrimination,”56 addressed a “legitimate and substantial interest” so long as
the discrimination in question was “identified.”57 The modifier, however,
proved fatal. Justice Powell suggested three procedural requirements that must
be met before racial preferences could be used to remedy past societal
discrimination. First, there must have been a finding of a constitutional or
statutory violation.58 Second, the finding had to have been made by an
authoritative government institution, specifically a judicial, legislative or
administrative body.59 Finally, remedial action based on such a finding usually
remained subject to “continuing oversight” to minimize the impact on other
innocent persons who were competing for the benefit in question.60 In Justice
Powell’s view, “[t]o hold otherwise would be to convert a remedy heretofore
reserved for violations of legal rights into a privilege that all institutions
throughout the Nation could grant at their pleasure to whatever groups are
A university was
perceived as victims of societal discrimination.”61
incompetent to make such findings because its mission was education, not
formulating legislative policy or adjudicating claims.62
Justice Powell also rejected the third of the University’s rationales, that its
program would improve the delivery of medical services to underserved
minority communities by providing more minority physicians who presumably
would administer to their needs.63 A better health care delivery system
presumably could “in some situations” be a compelling interest, but Justice
Powell found “virtually no evidence in the record” suggesting that the Davis
plan was needed or was designed to achieve that end.64 There were other ways
to produce physicians inclined to serve disadvantaged communities.65
60 VA. L. REV. 925, 942-43 (1974) (discussing the need for more minorities at campuses and in
professions relative to numbers in the population).
55. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307.
56. Id. at 306.
57. Id. at 307.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 308.
61. Id. at 310.
62. Id. at 309. Moreover, the University had made no such findings. Id. See also Hopwood
v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 942 (5th Cir. 1996) (reasoning that Justice Powell had found societal
discrimination was “never [an] appropriate” basis for race preference). But see Kenneth L. Karst
& Harold W. Horowitz, Affirmative Action and Equal Protection, 60 VA. L. REV. 955, 967-68
(1974) (defending societal discrimination as a rationale for racial preferences).
63. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 310.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 310-11. Some have misconstrued this rationale as the “role model” justification.
See, e.g., Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 942. Cf. Terrance Sandalow, Racial Preferences in Higher
Education: Political Responsibility and the Judicial Role, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 653 (1975)
(discussing the idea that more minority lawyers are needed to serve minorities).
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Justice Powell did recognize the fourth of the University’s rationales,
“attainment of a diverse student body,” as both permissible and compelling.66
This interest was anchored in the First Amendment, involved decisions within
the University’s domain and competence, and applied to undergraduate and
graduate education.67 Although the interest was sufficiently weighty to justify
a racial classification, the particular approach the Davis plan took was not
“necessary to promote this interest.”68 The Davis plan was defective in two
respects. First, it misconceived the “nature of the state interest that would
justify consideration of race or ethnic background.”69 The proper diversity
interest was not focused exclusively on race but recognized it as one
characteristic among many relevant traits. Race or ethnicity could constitute a
plus factor, but only when measured against a range of other qualities
including “exceptional personal talents, unique work or service experience,
leadership potential, maturity, demonstrated compassion, a history of
overcoming disadvantage, ability to communicate with the poor, or other
qualifications deemed important.”70 Moreover, the two-track Davis plan
involved a quota that excluded white applicants from competing for some
seats.71 By contrast, the Harvard College plan avoided these defects. It
considered race as one factor in creating a diverse student body. It treated race
or ethnicity as plus factors in a competition for all available spots in which
other diversity interests were also recognized.72 Such a plan treated “each
applicant as an individual in the admissions process,”73 not “as a mere stand-in
for some favorite group.”74 An unsuccessful candidate would not have been
excluded from “all consideration” for a place based on race or nationality, but
rather because his or her complete qualifications, including subjective ones,
were outweighed by those of others.75 Justice Powell endorsed the Harvard
College plan as a model.76
In Bakke, Justice Powell defined student body diversity as related entirely
to what happened on the campus. Universities should be able to choose
students to foster a “robust exchange of ideas.”77 This desired characteristic of
universities was implicit in academic freedom, a value Justice Powell anchored

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311.
Id. at 311-14.
Id. at 314-15.
Id. at 315.
Id. at 317.
See Bakke, 483 U.S. at 274-76.
Id. at 317.
Id. at 318.
Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law Sch., 233 F.3d 1188, 1197 (9th Cir. 2000).
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318.
Id. at 316-18.
Id. at 313.
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in the First Amendment. He cited eminent universities, like Harvard and
Princeton, which celebrated the value of diversity, racial, ethnic, and other
sorts, to create a climate conducive to such an exchange. Ironically, at the
Court’s conference on Bakke, Justice Powell had apparently appreciated a
broader purpose in diversity: “Diversity is a necessary goal to assure a broad
spectrum of Americans an opportunity for graduate school.”78 If Justice
Brennan’s conference notes accurately captured Justice Powell’s comments, he
seemed to be recognizing an instrumental purpose of diversity to develop more
minority physicians, not simply to create a pluralistic campus.
In his opinion, however, Justice Powell defended campus diversity solely
as a means to allow universities to pursue their educational missions. He did
not endorse the use of race in university admissions as a way to produce a
diverse pool of professionals and leaders. If anything, his opinion seemed to
reject that rationale, at least as presented by the University. On the contrary, it
saw the long-term value of a diverse student body as a way to give
professionals the benefit of exposure to different people and ideas.79 Put
differently, the University needed minority students not to increase the pool of
minority doctors, but rather so that those students otherwise studying there
would reap the benefits of a heterogeneous environment.
Justice Brennan, and those who joined his opinion,80 parted company with
Justice Powell in crucial respects. First, they rejected the idea that the
Constitution was color-blind, a concept that was aspirational at best but needed
to yield to circumstances.81 Second, they concluded that the concerns that led
the Court to categorize malevolent racial classifications as suspect did not
apply to those that served a remedial purpose. Justice Brennan recognized that
“racial classifications established for ostensibly benign purposes can be
misused”82 and accordingly thought a rational basis standard imposed too

78. THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE (1940-1985), at 740 (Del Dickson ed., 2001).
79. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313 (“the ‘nation’s future depends upon leaders trained through
wide exposure’ to the ideas and mores of students as diverse as this Nation of many peoples”)
(quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)); id. at 31314 (quoting Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950), regarding the importance of exposure to
diverse viewpoints at law school). According to Justice Powell:
Physicians serve a heterogeneous population. An otherwise qualified medical student
with a particular background—whether it be ethnic, geographic, culturally advantaged or
disadvantaged—may bring to a professional school of medicine experiences, outlooks,
and ideas that enrich the training of its student body and better equip its graduates to
render with understanding their vital service to humanity.
Id. at 314.
80. Justices White, Marshall and Blackmun joined Justice Brennan’s opinion. Each also
wrote his own separate statement.
81. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 327 (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part).
82. Id. at 361.
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lenient a filter.83
Such racial classifications should be subjected to
intermediate scrutiny, which would require that a benign racial classification
serve an important governmental objective and be substantially related to those
goals.84 Moreover, race classifications must not stigmatize any group.85 The
Court’s review should be “strict and searching” but not necessarily as fatal as
strict scrutiny was.86 Further, Justice Brennan thought that the Davis plan’s
purpose of “remedying the effects of past societal discrimination” passed
muster under the Equal Protection Clause.87 Whereas Justice Powell argued
that this rationale required findings by an authoritative governmental body,
Justice Brennan articulated the following broad principle:
[A] state government may adopt race-conscious programs if the purpose of
such programs is to remove the disparate racial impact its actions might
otherwise have and if there is reason to believe that the disparate impact is
itself the product of past discrimination, whether its own or that of society at
large.88

The Brennan four joined Justice Powell’s more limited conclusion that
race could be a factor in admissions decisions, but on altogether different
grounds. Indeed, they carefully qualified their endorsement of his rationale.
They never mentioned “diversity.” Rather, Justice Brennan’s opinion, in a
single grudging footnote, conceded that the Harvard College plan was
“constitutional under our approach, at least so long as the use of race to
achieve an integrated student body is necessitated by the lingering effects of
past discrimination.”89 Their approach advanced an altogether different
rationale for race-conscious admissions decisions. They saw it as an
appropriate remedy to compensate for disadvantages that past discrimination
and prejudice imposed on blacks. This compensatory rationale resonates
throughout the Brennan opinion.90
83. Id. at 358.
84. Id. at 359.
85. Id. at 361.
86. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 361-62.
87. Id. at 362. The rationale was “sufficiently important to justify the use of race-conscious
admissions programs where there is a sound basis for concluding that minority
underrepresentation is substantial and chronic, and that the handicap of past discrimination is
impeding access of minorities to the Medical School.” Id.
88. Id. at 369.
89. Id. at 326 n.1. Justice White did, however, join a paragraph of Justice Powell’s opinion
that stated “that the State has a substantial interest that legitimately may be served by a properly
devised admissions program involving the competitive consideration of race and ethnic origin.”
Id. at 320.
90. See, e.g., id. at 325 (speaking of the need “to remedy disadvantages cast on minorities by
past racial prejudice”); id. at 328 (explaining that Title VI does not preclude “preferential
treatment of racial minorities as a means of remedying past societal discrimination”); id. at 365
(citing the “effects of past discrimination” as the cause of lower minority enrollment); id. at 366
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It would be a gross understatement to suggest that Justice Marshall’s
separate statement simply echoed Justice Brennan’s emphasis on remedying
the effects of past discrimination, for Justice Marshall wrote with a passion and
power absent from Justice Brennan’s opinion. Justice Brennan was writing to
attract a sizeable bloc, an enterprise that probably required pulling a few
punches.91 Justice Marshall had no such ambition,92 and, accordingly, the
inhibitions that writing to obtain a Court generally impose did not restrain his
prose. He was free to articulate his individual slant on the issue. He
eloquently recounted the sorry American history of oppression of AfricanAmericans that legal equality had not redressed: “The position of the Negro
today in America is the tragic but inevitable consequence of centuries of
unequal treatment.”93 Universities had the power to “remedy the cumulative
effects of society’s discrimination by giving consideration to race in an effort
to increase the number and percentage of Negro doctors.”94 The Fourteenth
Amendment did not preclude institutions from addressing societal
discrimination, nor did it require identified individual victims because “the
racism of our society has been so pervasive that none, regardless of wealth or
position, has managed to escape its impact.”95 Although most of his opinion
expressed compensatory rhetoric,96 Justice Marshall sounded a related, but
different theme, an instrumental rationale. Abuse of African-Americans had
(stating that race-preference programs are acceptable to address “substantial, chronic minority
underrepresentation” because of “past racial discrimination”); id. at 368-70, 372 (stating that
race-conscious efforts are justified to remedy “past discrimination”).
91. Justice Brennan had prepared a memorandum to try to persuade Justice Powell to uphold
the Davis plan. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 48, at 88. When that quest proved fruitless, Justice
Brennan sought to prepare an opinion that would represent not only his views but those of
Justices White, Marshall and Blackmun. Id. at 139. Based on a letter he sent Justice White on
May 30, 1978, he was least sure his opinion would attract Justice Marshall. Id. It is, of course,
possible that his suggestion to Justice White that Justice Marshall was the least likely to join was
a strategic gambit to give the appearance that Brennan’s views were closer to White’s than to
Marshall’s and that some move needed to be made toward Justice Marshall to attract his support.
Id. If that was his purpose, it failed. Justice White responded to Justice Brennan’s draft, which
“was stronger in its language condemning racial discrimination than the final opinion,” by
suggesting “‘I am inclined to keep the decibel level as low as possible. We won’t accomplish
much by beating a white majority over past ills or by describing what has gone by as a system of
apartheid.’” Id. at 139 (quoting Letter from Justice White to Justice Brennan (June 13, 1978)).
Implicitly, Justice White was cautioning against adopting the rhetoric of Justices Marshall and
Blackmun’s opinion.
92. According to Justice Marshall’s biographer, he “rarely took part in any personal efforts
to affect outcomes.” MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 128 (1997).
93. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 395.
94. Id. at 396.
95. Id. at 400.
96. See, e.g., id. at 401 (for example, stating “where it is necessary to remedy the effects of
past discrimination”); id. at 402 (“I do not believe that anyone can truly look into America’s past
and still find that a remedy for the effects of that past is impermissible.”).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2004]

BEYOND BAKKE

913

kept America from reaching its promise: “The dream of America as the great
melting pot has not been realized for the Negro; because of his skin color he
never even made it into the pot.”97 Affirmative action was a strategy to make
America a truly pluralistic society: “[B]ringing the Negro into the mainstream
of American life should be a state interest of the highest order. To fail to do so
is to ensure that America will forever remain a divided society.”98 Justice
Marshall wrote, “If we are ever to become a fully integrated society, one in
which the color of a person’s skin will not determine the opportunities
available to him or her, we must be willing to take steps to open those doors.”99
Similarly, Justice Blackmun sounded the instrumental ideal of America.100
He thought that ways must be found to remedy the lack of minority doctors
and lawyers for the country to realize “its professed goal of [being] a society
that is not race conscious.”101 He imagined a time when the United States
would “reach a stage of maturity” where race preferences would be
unnecessary: “Then persons will be regarded as persons, and discrimination of
the type we address today will be an ugly feature of history that is instructive
but that is behind us.”102 He saw little difference between the Davis and
Harvard College plan.103 In any event, judges were not competent to design
admissions programs for universities and, accordingly, should defer to
academicians:104 “In order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of
race.”105
B.

Bakke Summarized

Justice Powell’s Bakke opinion recognized the ability of institutions to
voluntarily use race-conscious admissions plans. As such, he preserved a
strategy that was critical to completing Brown’s vision of a society without
second-class races of citizens. Ironically, he did so in a manner that departed
from or ignored Brown’s central premises. Where Brown celebrated the
importance of education as a way to allow African-Americans to participate in
democratic society and to share in the American dream, Justice Powell did not

97. Id. at 400-01.
98. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 396.
99. Id. at 401-02.
100. See id. at 403-07. Although Justice Brennan worried that Justice Marshall’s approach
might be counter-productive, it seems to have played a role in persuading Justice Brennan.
“There is much to be said for Thurgood’s ‘cruelest irony’ approach,” he wrote. Memorandum
from Justice Blackmun (May 1, 1978), quoted in TUSHNET, supra note 92, at 129; see also
SCHWARTZ, supra note 48, at 129.
101. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 403.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 406.
104. Id. at 404.
105. Id. at 407.
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embrace or even recognize those goals. He suggested race preferences were
compelling in order to transform campuses from homogeneous to diverse
environments. Whereas Brown sought to remedy the “feelings of inferiority”
of a racial minority, Justice Powell’s opinion articulated no such concern; on
the contrary, the beneficiaries of diversity, under his logic, were primarily
whites. Whereas Brown exhibited special solicitude for the feelings of
African-American children, Justice Powell denied that the Equal Protection
Clause had any “special wards”106 and thought racial classifications adverse to
whites should receive the same sort of scrutiny as those disparaging blacks.
Finally, whereas Brown was at its core a case about race in America, Justice
Powell’s opinion turned on race only in part. It struck down the Davis plan’s
set-aside because of its impact on whites, but held that race could be used as it
was in the Harvard College plan based on the First Amendment interests of
universities.
C. Post-Bakke Jurisprudence
For almost a quarter century after Bakke, the subject of racial preferences
in college and university admissions did not return to the Court. The Court did
address the constitutionality of racial preferences in other areas. Those
decisions took a somewhat meandering path marked often by indecision and
division. Much of that story is not directly relevant here. Several features
characterized the Court’s jurisprudence which do, however, relate to Grutter
and Gratz.
First, Bakke ushered in an era of some uncertainty.107 Many universities
imitated the Harvard College plan that Justice Powell endorsed.108 Yet, the
Court refused to embrace either Justice Powell’s or Justice Brennan’s
rationales generally, and Bakke’s status as law remained controversial.109
Second, the Court ultimately concluded that the Court should apply strict
scrutiny to all racial preferences, whether designed to hurt or help racial
minorities and whether enacted by federal or state government. The Court
reached that destination after some indecision. In cases following soon after
Bakke, only a plurality favored strict scrutiny, and, as late as 1990, a majority
did apply intermediate review in one case involving a federal affirmative

106. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 295. This passage outraged Justice Marshall who regarded it as
racist. See TUSHNET, supra note 92, at 128.
107. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 304-15 (1985).
108. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 316-18.
109. See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 492 (1980) (“This opinion does not
adopt, either expressly or implicitly, the formulas of analysis articulated in such cases as
[Bakke].”). See generally Gabriel J. Chin, Bakke to the Wall: The Crisis of Bakkean Diversity, 4
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 881, 925, 925 n.192 (1996) (collecting sources questioning Bakke’s
status).
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action plan.110 The addition of Justice Thomas to the Court in 1992 shifted the
balance on this issue and, in 1995, the Court held that strict scrutiny applied to
all racial classifications.111 Although a sizeable bloc on the Court has always
contended that the Court should scrutinize classifications that benefit
minorities less strictly than those that disparage them,112 every justice on the
Court during the past quarter century has agreed that even benevolent racial
classifications require some heightened scrutiny.113
Third, the contours of strict scrutiny in this area were drawn largely by
Justice O’Connor. Her opinion in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, which
drew upon her jurisprudence of the prior decade, recognized strict scrutiny as
the governing standard.114 The Court, she wrote, had established three general
propositions pertinent to the problem. Governmental racial classifications
should be viewed: (1) with skepticism; (2) consistently, whether favoring or
disadvantaging minorities; and, (3) congruently, whether imposed by federal or
state government.115 Thus, “any person, of whatever race,” was entitled to
have any governmental racial classification examined “under the strictest
judicial scrutiny.”116 Strict scrutiny was designed to consider “relevant
differences” between asserted justifications and the necessity of classification
used “to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate uses of race in governmental
decisionmaking.”117 As such, strict scrutiny was not inevitably fatal to the
classification at issue.118
Finally, the Court did not easily find that affirmative action plans satisfied
strict scrutiny. It had endorsed racial preferences as a remedy for past
discrimination attributed to a particular wrongdoer or group of offenders, but
had generally rejected other grounds. In Adarand, it overturned Metro
Broadcasting Inc. v. FCC, the one post-Bakke case to recognize diversity as a
The Court’s rejection of Metro
legitimate governmental objective.119
120
but, in her Metro Broadcasting
Broadcasting rested on other grounds,
110. See Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
111. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
112. See, e.g., id. at 243-49 (Stevens and Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting); Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co., 488 U.S. 469, 535-36 (1989) (Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting); Fullilove,
448 U.S. at 517-19 (Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring).
113. See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S.Ct. 2411, 2442-45 (2003) (Ginsburg, Souter, and
Breyer, JJ., dissenting) (applying intermediate scrutiny); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 362-63 (Brennan,
White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)
(applying intermediate scrutiny).
114. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227.
115. Id. at 223-24.
116. Id. at 224.
117. Id. at 228.
118. Id. at 230, 237.
119. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227.
120. See id. at 225-27.
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dissent, Justice O’Connor demonstrated little respect for a diversity rationale in
the context there presented:121 “The interest in increasing the diversity of
broadcast viewpoints is clearly not a compelling interest,”122 she wrote. And
several justices, including Justice O’Connor, arguably thought racial
classifications were only justifiable in “remedial settings.”123 Although some
correctly predicted Justice O’Connor would swing different ways in the two
cases,124 some of her affirmative action opinions should have given Michigan
Law School some pause. She had consistently held that the Court should
strictly scrutinize affirmative action plans125 and, in a different context, had
suggested that diversity was not a compelling interest.126 Moreover, she had
expressed misgivings about the use of goals in affirmative action cases.127
Finally, Justice O’Connor had previously written that, to survive strict scrutiny,
a racial classification had to “fit with greater precision than any alternative
remedy”128 and had criticized a decision-maker for not “expressly evaluat[ing]
the available alternative remedies.”129
IV. GRUTTER AND GRATZ
A.

The Cases Summarized

In Grutter, the Court reviewed a challenge to the University of Michigan
Law School’s admission program. The Law School policy articulated a
121. But see Akhil Reed Amar & Neal Kumar Katyal, Bakke’s Fate, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1745,
1759-67 (1996) (distinguishing university from broadcast diversity).
122. Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 612 (1990).
123. See id. at 613 (O’Connor, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia and
Kennedy, JJ.) (explaining that the remedying effects of racial discrimination was the only
compelling interest); Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (O’Connor, J.,
joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Kennedy, J.). But see Adarand, 515 U.S. at 239 (Scalia, J.
concurring) (rejecting remedial justification); Croson, 488 U.S. at 520-21 (Scalia, J., concurring)
(same).
124. See, e.g., Susan Low Bloch, Affirmative Action: The Aftermath of the University of
Michigan Cases, FEDERAL LAWYER, Oct. 2003, at 22, 25. Cf. Evan Caminker, A Glimpse Behind
and Beyond Grutter, 48 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 894-95.
125. See, e.g., Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227; Croson, 488 U.S. at 493-94 (plurality); United
States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 196-97 (1987) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (endorsing strict
scrutiny); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 285-86 (1986) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring) (same).
126. Metro Broad., Inc., 497 U.S. at 612 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“The interest in
increasing the diversity of broadcast viewpoints is clearly not a compelling interest.”); see also
Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 945 n.27 (5th Cir. 1996) (quoting Justice O’Connor as
unreceptive to student diversity).
127. See, e.g., Paradise, 480 U.S. at 197; Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 49697 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
128. Paradise, 480 U.S. at 199.
129. Id. at 201.
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commitment to achieving a diverse student body to enhance the education
offered. To that end, it recognized various bases of diversity admission while
reaffirming the Law School’s long-standing commitment to racial and ethnic
diversity, especially with respect to students who had been “historically
discriminated against” including African-Americans, Hispanics and Native
Americans.130 In reviewing approximately thirty-five hundred applications for
three hundred places, the Michigan plan considered not only grade point
average and Law School Admission Test (LSAT) scores, but other criteria
including letters of recommendation, the quality of the undergraduate
institution, the applicant’s essay, and undergraduate courses taken.131 It sought
to enroll a “critical mass” of under-represented minorities without identifying
any prescribed number.132 Barbara Grutter, a white female applicant, claimed
that despite her superior qualifications she was denied admission because the
Law School gave preference to other prospective students based on their race.
In Gratz, two unsuccessful white applicants challenged the University of
Michigan’s refusal to admit them as violative of the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment and of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.133
The University used a variety of measures to assign numerical scores to
applicants. Although the approaches varied in different years, the effect was to
admit certain minority students whose scores would not have indicated
admission had they been Caucasian.134
In her opinion for the Court in Grutter, Justice O’Connor recounted Justice
Powell’s Bakke opinion at length.135 Justice O’Connor followed Justice Powell
in several of his basic premises. Like Justice Powell, she thought the
Fourteenth Amendment protects persons, not groups.136 She shared his
conviction that the Constitution treated racial classifications in a consistent
manner regardless of their purpose. She followed him, and intervening
precedent as well, in concluding that strict scrutiny applied whenever the Court
considered the propriety of a racial classification.137 Such a classification was
not inevitably invalid.138 Rather, a racial category could be upheld if it served
a compelling state interest through a means that was narrowly tailored to
achieve that end. Ultimately Justice O’Connor did not rely on Bakke as
binding precedent, but instead endorsed Justice Powell’s conclusion that a

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2332 (2003).
Id.
Id. at 2333.
Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2417 (2003).
Id. at 2419.
Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2335-37.
Id. at 2337.
Id. at 2337-38.
Id. at 2338.
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diverse student body was a compelling enough interest to allow universities to
consider race in deciding whom to admit.139
Michigan Law School had defended its use of race in admissions based
solely upon “the educational benefits that flow from student body diversity,”140
a strategy Bakke, no doubt, influenced. In Grutter, Justice O’Connor
concluded that Michigan’s diversity rationale constituted a compelling state
interest.141 In part, the Court deferred to the Law School’s academic
judgments that were within its particular expertise: “[A]ttaining a diverse
student body is at the heart of the Law School’s proper institutional
mission.”142 A diverse student body creates a range of educational benefits,
including a richer classroom environment and improved understanding among
the races, all of which better prepares students for an increasingly diverse
workplace and society.143 Justice O’Connor also identified other benefits from
student body diversity that were independent of its impact on the campus.
Citing an amicus brief of civilian and uniformed leaders of America’s
military,144 the Court concluded that the military required a “‘racially diverse
officer corps’” to provide for national security.145 The military could only
attract the requisite diverse mix of officers if military academies and
universities with Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) used race-conscious
admissions criteria.146 Similarly, American corporations needed a pool of
employees capable of interacting successfully in a multicultural global
economy.147 Because education was the foundation of citizenship and civic
participation, “public institutions of higher education must be accessible to all
individuals regardless of race or ethnicity.”148 Finally, law schools must be
open to qualified members of all races so that professional and leadership
opportunities will be available to all.149

139. Id. at 2337 (“We do not find it necessary to decide whether Justice Powell’s opinion is
binding [precedent].”). Michigan Law School had argued, at length, that Bakke should be applied
under the factors identified in the plurality opinion in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). Brief for Respondent at 17-21, Grutter, 123 S. Ct.
2325 (No. 02-241).
140. Id. at 14.
141. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2339.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 2339-40.
144. Consolidated Brief of Lt. Gen. Julius W. Becton, Jr. et al. at 27, Grutter, 123 S. Ct. 2325
(Nos. 02-241, 02-516).
145. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2340 (quoting Consolidated Brief of Lt. Gen. Julius W. Becton, Jr.
et al. at 27, Grutter, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (Nos. 02-241, 02-516)).
146. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2340.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 2340-41.
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The Court found that Michigan’s racial preference was narrowly tailored to
its goal of creating a diverse student body. Michigan’s program used race in a
“flexible, nonmechanical” way.150 It did not involve a quota system but used
race simply as a plus factor in an individualized assessment in which no
applicant was insulated from a competition with all other candidates. Race
was only one of many diversity factors that Michigan considered in making
admissions decisions.151 Michigan Law School did not “limit in any way the
broad range of qualities and experiences that may be considered valuable
contributions to student body diversity.”152 On the contrary, “the Law School
actually gives substantial weight to diversity factors besides race.”153 Further,
the Law School had considered various race-neutral alternatives—a lottery,
reducing academic standards, and percentage plans—all of which proved to be
inferior approaches. Finally, Justice O’Connor articulated a requirement that
the duration of the race preference be limited:154 “We expect that 25 years
from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further
the interest approved today.”155
In Gratz, the Court struck down the University of Michigan’s
undergraduate admissions program. It varied in different years. In essence, for
several years, the program evaluated applicants based on adjusted grade point
average and standardized test scores. These scores were then placed on a grid
that dictated the admission decision. Different grids were used for minority
and nonminority students.156 Beginning in 1998, applicants were ranked on a
one hundred fifty-point index, with one hundred points required for admission.
Members of under-represented minorities were given twenty points.157
Again applying strict scrutiny and bound by Grutter’s holding that student
body diversity was a compelling interest, the Court held that Michigan’s plan

150. Id. at 2342.
151. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2344 (stating that “all factors that may contribute to student body
diversity are meaningfully considered alongside race in admissions decisions”).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. The idea of a durational limit was not new. During the Bakke conference on December
9, 1977, Justice Stevens remarked that preferences should be temporary devices that would only
be needed for a few more years. Justice Marshall replied that they would be needed for another
one hundred years. See JEFFRIES, supra note 48, at 487; TUSHNET, supra note 92, at 127. Justice
Blackmun suggested in his opinion that such programs might need to last for a decade. Regents
of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 403 (1978). Some court insiders suggested Justice
Stevens might have joined an opinion endorsing racial preferences for a limited time but was put
off by Justice Marshall’s response. See THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE, supra note 78, at
740 n.253.
155. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2347.
156. Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2418-19 (2003).
157. Id. at 2419.
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was not narrowly tailored to serve that interest.158 The plan did not provide for
the “individualized consideration” that Justice Powell required in Bakke.
Instead, the twenty-point bump based simply on race was likely to prove
decisive.159
B. Grutter-Gratz Assessed
Cases dealing with race preferences in admissions tend to raise three
questions. First, what level of scrutiny is appropriate? Second, what ends can
justify such programs? Third, what means can universities use to achieve
those ends? Grutter-Gratz raised these issues and went beyond Bakke in
significant ways. Together they flexed the strict scrutiny standard, recognized
additional rationales for universities to use race preferences, and redrew the
lines Bakke had suggested defining permissible and illegal plans. The first and
third issues are discussed in this section; the second, addressing justifications,
is the subject of Section V.
1.

Strict Scrutiny

Courts classically used strict scrutiny to examine racial classifications that
discriminated against racial minorities. Strict scrutiny therefore imposed upon
those defending a classification a heavy burden of justification.160 If rigidly
applied, the test constrained governmental actions by allowing government to
use a suspect classification only to serve a compelling interest when there is no
other way to achieve that end. It also smokes out illicit purposes by requiring
that such classifications fit closely to the compelling interest.161 A gap
between means and ends suggests that the asserted compelling interest was not
the true justification, that the proffered rationale was a subterfuge for some
discriminatory purpose. Statutes and practices discriminating against racial
minorities have presented the paradigmatic cases in which courts used strict
scrutiny. Characteristically, the Court during the last half-century or so struck
down such classifications. On the rare occasions when it failed to do so, the
Court generally displayed great deference to military authorities, accepted
national security as a compelling interest, and misapplied the test by not
requiring a very close fit between means and ends.162 In Bakke, Justice Powell

158. Id. at 2426-27.
159. Id. at 2428.
160. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 357 (Brennan, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“[A] government practice or statute which restricts
‘fundamental rights’ or which contains ‘suspect classifications’ is to be subjected to ‘strict
scrutiny’ and can be justified only if it furthers a compelling government purpose and, even then,
only if no less restrictive alternative is available.”).
161. Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2338 (2003).
162. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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argued that any classification based on race was suspect and warranted strict
scrutiny163—a position the Court ultimately adopted.164
Whereas Justice Powell alone in Bakke advocated the use of strict scrutiny
for racial classifications,165 Justice O’Connor ostensibly carried with her a full
Court in agreeing on that standard. Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer joined Justice O’Connor’s Grutter opinion. The four dissenters166 also
agreed that strict scrutiny should apply.167 In Gratz, the Grutter dissenters plus
Justice O’Connor again applied strict scrutiny. Indeed, Justice O’Connor in
Grutter, and Chief Justice Rehnquist in his Grutter dissent and Gratz majority
opinion, used quite similar language and citations to describe the strict scrutiny
test. The use of strict scrutiny was not surprising in view of Adarand and
Justice O’Connnor’s other affirmative action opinions.
The apparent consensus on strict scrutiny in Grutter-Gratz was misleading.
The four justices who joined Justice O’Connor’s Grutter opinion did not share
her commitment to strict scrutiny in this context. In Grutter, Justice Ginsburg
noted in a concurrence that because the Law School’s admissions policy
survived “review under the standards stated in [Adarand]” the Court need not
“revisit whether all governmental classifications by race, whether designed to
benefit or to burden a historically disadvantaged group, should be subject to
the same standard of judicial review.”168 In Gratz, Justice Ginsburg was more
direct. She objected that “the Court once again maintains that the same

163. Justice Powell offered three rationales to support his conclusion. First, he suggested that
distinctions based on race are odious and accordingly “inherently suspect.” Bakke, 438 U.S. at
290-91. Even preferences designed to help disadvantaged minorities are so tainted. It might not
be clear that a preference was benign, as preferences might “reinforce common stereotypes
holding that certain groups are unable to achieve success without special protection based on a
factor having no relationship to individual worth” and preferences imposed costs on innocent
people like Bakke who bear the cost. Id. at 298. Second, he suggested that distinguishing
between suspect and permitted racial classifications would engage courts in judgments not
conducive to judicial resolution. Many minority groups have some grounds for complaint about
their treatment here. How do we construct a constitutional test to decide on some principled basis
which racial or ethnic classifications merit strict scrutiny and which do not? Courts would have
to decide which minorities had suffered sufficiently to warrant preference. Id. at 296-97. Finally,
law is supposed to be certain and stable. The determinations involved would be subject to change
to accommodate the flow of history, yet “[t]he kind of variable sociological and political analysis
necessary to produce such rankings simply does not lie within the judicial competence.” Id. at
297. A uniform standard would contribute to those ends whereas a discriminatory test would
commit the Court to a jurisprudence of perpetual reexamination.
164. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
165. Those who joined Justice Stevens’s opinion avoided the question by limiting their
decision to statutory grounds. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 408-21.
166. The four dissenters are Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and
Thomas.
167. Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2365-66 (2003).
168. Id. at 2348 n.1.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

922

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 48:899

standard of review controls judicial inspection of all official race
Justices Souter and Breyer joined this complaint.
classifications.”169
“Consistency,” which was Justice O’Connor’s own contribution170 loses its
allure, they suggested, when one considered America’s discriminatory past,
which continues to cast its shadow over current distribution of resources.171
Governmental decision-makers can properly distinguish between racial
classifications used to foster equality and those intended to subordinate, Justice
Ginsburg contended.172 Justices Ginsburg, Souter, Breyer, and perhaps
Stevens173 accordingly would prefer to apply different standards to review
racial classifications depending upon whether they are used to exclude, or
include, minority groups. In this stance, they followed the course that four
members of the Court urged in Bakke. Although Justice Ginsburg did not
explicitly endorse a particular standard, her insistence that not all racial
classifications are the same suggested a gentler standard of review than strict
scrutiny. To be sure, she would not give a pass to a “mere assertion of a
laudable governmental purpose.”174 Accordingly, she would not apply the
forgiving rational basis standard to racial preference. She would subject them
to “careful judicial inspection” and to “[c]lose review.”175 These standards
suggest some intermediate level of review tougher than mere rationality, but
more flexible than strict scrutiny.
The Grutter dissenters were less subtle in their displeasure at the level of
scrutiny in Grutter. Chief Justice Rehnquist thought the Court’s claim to apply
strict scrutiny illusory: “Although the Court recites the language of our strict
scrutiny analysis, its application of that review is unprecedented in its
deference.”176 Justice Kennedy was more harsh, suggesting that the Court had
“manipulated [the strict scrutiny test] to distort its real and accepted
meaning.”177 In so doing, it “undermine[d] both the test and its own
controlling precedents.”178 The Court’s review had been “perfunctory,” not
strict.179

169. Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2442 (2003).
170. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 224 (1995).
171. Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2443.
172. Id. at 2444.
173. Justice Stevens had drawn this distinction on earlier occasions. See, e.g., Adarand, 515
U. S. at 243-45 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990)
(upholding racial classification under intermediate scrutiny with Justice Stevens in the majority).
174. Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2445.
175. Id.
176. Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2366 (2003); see also id. at 2370 (accusing the
Court of “an unprecedented display of deference under our strict scrutiny analysis”).
177. Id. at 2370.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 2371.
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Grutter, then, presented an anomalous situation in which four members of
the Court who joined an opinion based on strict scrutiny did not really believe
that standard should apply to race preference in admissions. The Grutter
dissenters, who believed such plans should be measured against strict scrutiny,
did not believe the Michigan plan passed muster. They believed the Court did
not really apply strict scrutiny to the Michigan Law School program. Only
Justice O’Connor both believed strict scrutiny should apply to racial
classifications benefiting minorities and that Michigan Law School’s program
satisfied that test.
On earlier occasions, Justice O’Connor’s colleagues had suggested that she
exercised a more lenient brand of strict scrutiny. Indeed, in some respects, her
strict scrutiny resembled Justice Brennan’s intermediate review as he described
it in Bakke. Review of race preferences, he said, should be “strict—not strict
in theory and fatal in fact,”180 a formulation Justice O’Connor adopted.181
Justice Scalia had observed that Justice O’Connor’s rendition of strict scrutiny
showed “that our concepts of equal protection enjoy a greater elasticity than
the standard categories might suggest.”182 Justices Ginsburg and Breyer
inferred from Justice O’Connor’s Adarand opinion that strict scrutiny would
invalidate racial classifications burdening discrete minorities but would not
inevitably be fatal to those designed to foster equality.183 They applauded her
reiteration that strict scrutiny separates legitimate from illegitimate uses of race
and thought that the decision permitted change to accommodate new
circumstances.184 Justice O’Connor herself had noted overlap between Justice
Powell’s formulation of strict scrutiny and the intermediate scrutiny that
Justice Brennan would apply. The distinction between “compelling” and
“important” was “negligible,” she suggested.185 Indeed, in Grutter she
occasionally used “important.”186 She was careful to emphasize that “[n]ot
every decision influenced by race is equally objectionable.”187 Strict scrutiny
was designed “to provide a framework for carefully examining the importance
and the sincerity of the reasons advanced by the governmental decisionmaker
for the use of race in that particular context.”188

180. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 361-62 (1978) (internal quotations
omitted).
181. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2338; Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237
(1995).
182. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 268.
183. Id. at 275 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
184. Id. at 275-76.
185. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 286 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
186. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2338.
187. Id.
188. Id.
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In fact, the Court in Grutter did apply a less rigorous form of strict scrutiny
than it had in the past. The Court typically had found compelling only those
rare justifications that are truly irresistible, like national security,189 remedying
prior discrimination,190 or vindicating First Amendment values.191 Justice
O’Connor engaged in a curious methodology in deciding that diversity was
compelling. In essence, the Court deferred to the “Law School’s educational
judgment that such diversity is essential to its educational mission.”192 That
judgment might be correct and appropriate. Yet it seems something of an
oxymoron to claim to be using strict scrutiny even while confessing deference
to the party being scrutinized.193 Indeed, the predicate of strict scrutiny is that
the classification being used renders deference inappropriate.194 In Grutter, the
Court deferred in identifying the compelling interest and in measuring the
fit.195
Moreover, the Court’s presumption of the good faith of the University196
also departed from strict scrutiny. Strict scrutiny presumes that racial
classifications are invalid and makes the government prove its good faith by
showing a compelling interest and a close fit. Indeed, elsewhere, Justice
O’Connor stated that strict scrutiny is applied to “smoke out illegitimate uses
of race.”197 But how can strict scrutiny smoke out illegitimate uses of race if
the good faith of the user is presumed? Acknowledging good faith of
universities might be appropriate, but it seems at odds with strict scrutiny.
Justice O’Connor recognized this problem, but her response was
unconvincing:
Our scrutiny of the interest asserted by the Law School is no less strict for
taking into account complex educational judgments in an area that lies
primarily within the expertise of the university. Our holding today is in

189. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
190. See, e.g., Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); United States v. Paradise,
480 U.S. 149 (1987).
191. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
192. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2339.
193. See id. at 2373 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“Deference is antithetical to strict scrutiny, not
consistent with it.”).
194. To be sure, the Court deferred heavily to military authorities in Korematsu. Yet the
deference was not in deciding that national security was a compelling interest, hardly a
controversial issue, but rather in deciding the means appropriate to vindicating that interest. See
Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 218-19.
195. Justice Kennedy, in dissent, was willing to accept the “objective of racial diversity . . .
based on empirical data known to us,” but criticized the Court for deferring to the University
regarding implementation. See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2370-71.
196. Id. at 2339.
197. Id. at 2338 (internal quotations omitted).
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keeping with our tradition of giving a degree of deference to a university’s
academic decisions, within constitutionally prescribed limits.198

Justice O’Connor cannot have it both ways. “Strict scrutiny” and “deference”
are at opposite ends of the spectrum. It might be appropriate to defer to a
university regarding areas within its expertise, but deference is one hundred
eighty degrees away from strict scrutiny. School diversity might be a
compelling goal but, under conventional applications of strict scrutiny, that is a
judgment for the Court to make and is not one where deference is appropriate.
The deference to universities might, of course, be grounded in values
implicit in the First Amendment, as Justice Powell had argued a quarter
century earlier. Academic freedom is a “special concern of the First
Amendment,” he wrote. “The freedom of a university to make its own
judgments as to education includes the selection of its student body.”199 A
university’s judgment that student body diversity promotes education therefore
finds shelter under the First Amendment. Justice Powell could view choosing
a diverse student body as a compelling interest based on this link to First
Amendment values.200
It is not clear that the Court leaned heavily on the First Amendment in
Grutter. To be sure, Justice O’Connor did note that “[w]e have long
recognized that, given the important purpose of public education and the
expansive freedoms of speech and thought associated with the university
environment, universities occupy a special niche in our constitutional
tradition.”201 She also observed that Justice Powell, in recognizing student
body diversity as a compelling interest, “invoked our cases recognizing a
constitutional dimension, grounded in the First Amendment, of educational
autonomy.”202 Yet Justice O’Connor never explicitly rested her own
conclusion on the First Amendment. Her references to the First Amendment
cited what the Court or Justice Powell had done in the past; she did not
explicitly adopt those sources as reflecting the Grutter Court’s interpretation.
And her clincher, which followed these citations, did not depend on the First
Amendment. Instead, it rested her conclusion that diversity is a compelling
interest on (1) “our view that attaining a diverse student body is at the heart of
the Law School’s proper institutional mission” and (2) a presumption of good
faith.203
198. Id. at 2339.
199. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978).
200. Justice Kennedy criticized the Court for abandoning “rigorous judicial review,” which he
associated with Justice Powell’s Bakke approach. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2370. Of course, Justice
Powell did not need to measure the implementation of the Harvard College plan, which he
approved but that was not before the Court.
201. Id. at 2339.
202. Id.
203. Id. Justice O’Connor noted:
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The Court seemed, then, to be placing a lower hurdle for racial
classifications benefiting minorities in admissions decisions than on those
burdening them. A thought experiment helps test this proposition.204 Imagine
that a particular law school determined that student diversity would be served
by admitting fewer Jewish, Asian-American, or, for that matter, AfricanAmerican students and that the same institution designed a narrowly tailored
Harvard College-type program to serve that end. Would the Court have
deferred to such a policy to advance the compelling interest of student
diversity in the narrowly tailored way here hypothesized? For Justice
O’Connor to perform her strict scrutiny test consistently she would need to
assess such a plan by asking whether campus diversity was a compelling
interest and whether the minority restriction was narrowly tailored. Yet it is
possible that such a program would be invalidated as a per se violation of the
Equal Protection Clause without running it through the justificatory screen.205
If this prediction is correct, it suggests that in fact the Grutter majority would
treat differently preferences that benefit minorities from those that burden
them.206 This is as it should be. Ultimately, Justice O’Connor’s decision to
relax the strict scrutiny in Grutter is appropriate because racial preferences
favoring minorities do not deserve the same degree of suspicion as do those
burdening them.
Racial preferences for minorities find their justification on entirely
different grounds than do those for whites. Minority preferences relate to
disadvantages attributable to a history of oppression that compromise the
ability of some minorities to compete and accordingly leave them underrepresented on campuses and in various leadership and professional cohorts.207
As Justice Marshall wrote in Bakke, “It is because of a legacy of unequal
treatment that we now must permit the institutions of this society to give

Our conclusion that the Law School has a compelling interest in a diverse student body is
informed by our view that attaining a diverse student body is at the heart of the Law
School’s proper institutional mission, and that “good faith” on the part of a university is
“presumed” absent “a showing to the contrary.”
Id.
204. Cf. DWORKIN, supra note 107, at 313-14.
205. Indeed, Justices Ginsburg and Souter seemed to count the fact that a program favored
disadvantaged groups and was not designed “to limit or decrease enrollment by any particular
racial or ethnic group” as an important factor in assessing it. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct.
2411, 2445 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
206. Cf. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2361 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(referring to the Court’s “implicit rejection of [the idea] that beneficial and burdensome racial
classifications are equally invalid”).
207. See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2443 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“This
insistence on ‘consistency’ would be fitting were our Nation free of the vestiges of rank
discrimination long reinforced by law.”) (citations omitted).
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consideration to race in making decisions about who will hold the positions of
influence, affluence, and prestige in America.”208
Preferences in favor of minorities, unlike their predecessors, do not reflect
racial prejudice. Benevolent motives—to achieve campus diversity, to redress
past wrongs, and to create a more pluralistic society—inform them. What
makes racial classifications suspect is not that race is immutable. It is rather
that such distinctions have historically reflected stereotypes based on
prejudice.209 There is a difference between programs of exclusion and those of
inclusion,210 or, in Justice Stevens’s formulation, “between a ‘No Trespassing’
sign and a welcome mat.”211
Finally, the reason to view race as a suspect classification does not apply
when a minority is the beneficiary. Prejudice against “discrete and insular
minorities” might distort the fair operation of “those political processes
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities.”212 White majorities might
discriminate against “discrete and insular minorities” who might not be able to
form coalitions to defend their interests. Majorities do not face the same risks.
As John Hart Ely explained:
There is no danger that the coalition that makes up the white majority in our
society is going to deny to whites generally their right to equal concern and
respect. Whites are not going to discriminate against all whites for reasons of
racial prejudice, and neither will they be tempted generally to underestimate
the needs and deserts of whites relative to those, say, of blacks or to
overestimate the costs of devising a more finely tuned classification system
that would extend to certain whites the advantages they are extending to
blacks. The function of the Equal Protection Clause . . . is largely to protect
against substantive outrages by requiring that those who would harm others
must at the same time harm themselves—or at least widespread elements of the
constituency on which they depend for reelection. The argument does not
work the other way around, however: similar reasoning supports no insistence
that our representatives cannot hurt themselves, or the majority on whose
208. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 401 (1978).
209. See DWORKIN, supra note 107, at 301.
210. See, e.g., Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2434 (Breyer, J., concurring); id. at 2444 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 316 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
211. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U. S. 200, 245 (1995) (Steven, J. dissenting).
Paul Freund exposed the difference in a 1964 article. He wrote:
There is finally the moral, and it may be the legal, difference between a preference in
favor of a minority and one against it. Compare a trust fund donated to a university, the
income to be used for the education of the descendants of John Hancock, and an unrelated
fund for the education of anyone except those descendants. It would not be surprising if
the governing board of the university felt differently about the two preferences, and
judges might be animated by the same sense of justice in applying the constitutional
guarantee of equal protection of the laws.
PAUL A. FREUND, ON LAW AND JUSTICE 47 (1968).
212. United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
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support they depend, without at the same time hurting others as well. Whether
or not it is more blessed to give than to receive, it is surely less suspicious.213

Ultimately, the argument for a uniform standard is unpersuasive. The
notion of a color-blind Constitution might be a pleasing metaphor but “it is not
a constitutional text.”214 American society is color-conscious, not color-blind,
and this is a fact that flows inexorably from our history. Race remains a potent
defining characteristic.215 To the extent a color-blind Constitution represents
an aspiration, it can only be achieved by allowing greater tolerance for racial
preferences that favor minorities than those that subjugate them.216
Indeed, the call for consistent application of strict scrutiny ignores the fact
that American history has not been symmetrical. As Justice Marshall wrote in
Bakke, “it is more than a little ironic that, after several hundred years of classbased discrimination against Negroes, the Court is unwillingly to hold that a
class-based remedy for that discrimination is permissible.”217
To be sure, deciding which minorities merit preference and for how long
might involve courts in making difficult judgments, as Justice Powell
observed. Yet strict scrutiny does not relieve the judiciary from making these
same judgments. Ultimately, it must make them in deciding whether
justifications for particular preferences are compelling and whether the
programs used are narrowly tailored. Moreover, these decisions will
necessarily evolve over time based on changing historical circumstances.
Justice O’Connor is correct to apply a kinder, gentler scrutiny to
admissions classifications designed to benefit disadvantaged minorities. Yet
the insistence on the same standard to review both types of classification is
unfortunate. It might confuse courts and attorneys involved in litigating the
standards. They might understandably take their cues from Justice O’Connor’s
words rather than her actions.
Moreover, the symmetrical language obscures the underlying issues at
stake. It is not difficult to appreciate the Court’s desire to offer a formal test to
handle these problems. Yet the emphasis on standards of review tends to
divert attention from the underlying principles involved. Instead of focusing
on the fundamental differences between racial classifications discriminating
against blacks and those helping them, the use of a uniform standard tends to
camouflage these issues behind a formal facade.
213. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 170-71
(1980); see also Adarand, 515 U.S. at 247-48 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (distinguishing legislative
decision to burden the minority from the majority race).
214. FREUND, supra note 211, at 45.
215. See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 107, at 294.
216. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (Blackmun, J.)
(“In order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of race. There is no other way. And
in order to treat some persons equally, we must treat them differently.”).
217. Id. at 400.
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Narrowly Tailored

The Grutter Court’s description of the “narrow tailored” prong suggested
some flexing of that requirement as well. Bakke had established that race as
used in the Harvard College plan was acceptable but set-asides were not.
Bakke did not say, however, whether the Harvard approach touched the outer
limit of constitutionality or whether mechanical approaches short of quotas
were also within constitutional bounds.218 In Bakke, Justice Powell rather
easily found the Davis plan’s sixteen-place set-aside was not narrowly tailored.
Conversely, he found a plan, like Harvard’s, which used race as a plus factor,
constitutionally sufficient. Yet the University of California-Davis had not
implemented the Harvard College’s plan, and Harvard’s conduct was not
before the Court. Justice Powell accordingly could address the contours of the
Harvard College plan without examining its application.
In Grutter, the parties litigated a Harvard-like plan and its implementation.
Grutter-Gratz moved the lines Bakke had set in both directions. Gratz made
clear that not only quotas but also mechanical allotments of substantial points
were not narrowly tailored. The “automatic” award of points was a defective
system because it was not individualized and because it tended to be outcomedeterminative.219 Gratz thereby tightened the fit requirement. On the other
hand, Grutter stretched a bit the extent to which schools could use targets. The
Harvard College plan had renounced using “set target-quotas” but
acknowledged the need to pay “some attention to numbers” so that minorities
would not be isolated.220 Justice O’Connor made clear that a school could seek
a “critical mass” of minority students without violating the Equal Protection
Clause.221 It could have “minimum goals for minority enrollment.”222 To that
end, it could consult daily tracking reports to measure its success in admitting
minorities.223 Whereas Justice Powell suggested only that the weight given
race might vary from year to year subject to the characteristics of the student
body and applicant pool,224 Justice O’Connor implied that more attention
might be given to race. A school could give “greater ‘weight’ to race than to
some other factors, in order to achieve student body diversity,”225 Justice
O’Connor explained, presumably so long as it did not do so in a way that made
race or ethnicity “the defining feature”226 of an applicant as had the
218. See DWORKIN, supra note 107, at 306.
219. Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2429-31 (2003). But see id. at 2432-33 (O’Connor,
J., concurring) (criticizing the Michigan plan for a lack of “individualized review”).
220. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 323.
221. Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2343 (2003).
222. Id. at 2342.
223. Id. at 2343.
224. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317-18.
225. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2342.
226. Id. at 2343.
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undergraduate school in the mechanical approach rejected in Gratz. To be
sure, Justice O’Connor emphasized that race could not be the only diversity
factor valued. The Law School scored points because it “does not . . . limit in
any way the broad range of qualities and experiences that may be considered
valuable contributions to student body diversity.”227 It “gives substantial
weight to diversity factors besides race,”228 such as foreign travel, community
service, and overcoming hardship. The Law School’s program “considers race
as one factor among many, in an effort to assemble a student body that is
diverse in ways broader than race.”229
Justice O’Connor’s method of reviewing implementation suggested that
the “narrow tailored” requirement allowed deference to the tailor’s judgment
rather than a close measure of snugness. She relied essentially on the
testimony of admissions officers and the fact that the number of minority
students who matriculated at the Law School varied from year to year. She
largely ignored or dismissed evidence that suggested discrepancies in
implementation. For instance, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted the large
disparities between the numbers of African-Americans admitted compared to
Native-Americans and wondered why the critical mass concept tolerated such
differences. He pointed out the close resemblance between the percentage of
minorities in each group who applied and those admitted.230 Justice Kennedy
also argued that the consistency in numbers suggested a hidden quota.231
Regardless of the merits of the debate, Justice O’Connor’s lack of concern
with these details seemed inconsistent with classic narrow tailoring. Instead of
insisting that the Law School show a close fit, she seemed content to take a
distant view. Indeed, Justice O’Connor made clear that narrow tailoring was
not synonymous with the least restrictive alternative analysis.232 The Law
School must make a “good faith consideration of workable race-neutral
alternatives,” but it need not exhaust every last possibility nor need it
compromise standards.233
The final characteristic of fit involved the projected life span of the
preferences. Whereas Bakke was silent regarding the duration of racial

227. Id. at 2344.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 2345.
230. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2368.
231. Id. at 2371.
232. Id. at 2344 (“Narrow tailoring does not require exhaustion of every conceivable raceneutral alternative.”). But see id. at 2365 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (explaining that strict
scrutiny requires that a racial classification fit the compelling interest “‘with greater precision
than any alternative means’”) (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280 n.6
(1986)).
233. Id. at 2345.
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preferences, Grutter said such programs “must be limited in time.”234 Indeed,
Justice O’Connor used imperative language repeatedly to emphasize the
mandatory nature of a sunset provision.235 Still, she hedged her bets as to
when the sun would set. Contrary to Justice Thomas’s claim, she did not hold
that race preference plans will end in twenty-five years. “We expect that 25
years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to
further the interest approved today,”236 she wrote. Her use of “expect” left
some wriggle room to account for developments during the next quarter
century. As Justice Ginsberg put it, the twenty-five year concept was a “hope”
rather than a “firm forecast.”237
Justice Thomas’s repeated characterization of the Court’s “holding” that
race preferences in higher education “will be illegal in 25 years” reflected
either wishful thinking, sloppy reading, or deliberate distortion.238 Indeed,
Justice Thomas supported his interpretation of the Court’s decision by a
parenthetical explanation that the majority “stat[ed] that racial discrimination
will no longer be narrowly tailored, or ‘necessary to further’ a compelling state
interest in 25 years.”239 The majority said no such thing. Justice O’Connor
prefaced her language with “we expect.” The verb, which Justice Thomas
conveniently ignored, controlled the sentence and revealed Justice Thomas’s
misreading. By contrast, Chief Justice Rehnquist accurately depicted the
majority’s language as a tentative suggestion.240
The approach that the Court endorsed makes it more difficult for judicial
scrutiny of admissions plans to take place because it requires that such
decisions consider various subjective factors on a case-by-case basis. No
doubt, it will be more difficult and more expensive for admissions offices to do
their work than it would have been if Gratz had been decided the other way.
Individual admissions officers might pursue their own agendas and consider

234. Id. at 2346.
235. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2346 (stating that “race-conscious admissions policies must be
limited in time;” “the requirement that all governmental use of race must have a logical end
point;” “[t]he requirement that all race-conscious admissions programs have a termination
point”).
236. Id. at 2347.
237. Id. at 2348.
238. See id. at 2350 (“I agree with the Court’s holding that racial discrimination in higher
education admissions will be illegal in 25 years.”); id. at 2363-64 (“The Court also holds that
racial discrimination in admissions should be given another 25 years before it is deemed no
longer narrowly tailored to the Law School’s fabricated compelling state interest.”); id. at 2364
(“Nor is the Court’s holding that racial discrimination will be unconstitutional in 25 years made
contingent on the gap closing in that time.”); id. at 2365 (“I therefore can understand the
imposition of a 25-year time limit only as a holding . . . .”).
239. Id. at 2350-51.
240. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2369-70 (“The Court suggests a possible 25-year limitation on the
Law School’s current program.”).
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race to the exclusion of other forms of diversity. Yet under the approach the
Court has approved in Grutter, these activities will take place largely below the
judicial radar screen and Justice O’Connor has signaled that courts need not
insist on a skin-tight fit to accept a plan.
V. THE RATIONALE FOR RACE PREFERENCES
Grutter is most significant for the way it might transform the debate about
the justifications of race preferences. Justice O’Connor expanded Justice
Powell’s student diversity rationale to incorporate instrumental goals.
Whereas Justice Powell saw diversity essentially as a means to enhance
campus discussion, Justice O’Connor saw it as a way also to achieve basic
American ideals regarding a racially pluralistic society. In order to appreciate
the contributions that Grutter makes, it is useful to consider the ways in which
race preferences have been justified.
A.

Justifying Race Preferences: A Historical View

The idea that diversity contributes to education is neither new nor
historically dependent upon the debate about race preferences. On the
contrary, long before Bakke, or even Brown, universities appreciated the
advantages of student body diversity.241 To be sure, early applications of the
concept did not include race. Instead, universities defined diversity largely as
exposure to competing ideas.242 Not surprisingly, proponents of diversity soon
came to recognize that the vital assortment of ideas would more likely
characterize a campus that included students from different regional, national,
economic, and ethnic backgrounds.243 The concept of educational diversity
was not artificially contrived to justify racial preference. Rather, it preceded
race preference as an educational strategy, but eventually expanded to include
race as a relevant factor.
Student body diversity was not, however, always the only, or even the
preferred, rationale for racial preferences in admissions. Historically,
proponents advanced two other justifications. First, a compensatory or
remedial justification grew from the premise that African-Americans have
historically gotten a bad deal in America, that the history of slavery, Jim Crow,
and social ostracism have denied them anything approximating a fair and equal

241. See, e.g., WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER 218-19 (1998)
(demonstrating that the “concept of diversity is far from new in American higher education”);
NEIL L. RUDENSTINE, The University and Diversity, in POINTING OUR THOUGHTS: REFLECTIONS
ON HARVARD AND HIGHER EDUCATION, 1991–2001, at 17 (2001) (collection of addresses and
essays tracing diversity at Harvard to the mid-Nineteenth Century).
242. Neil L. Rudenstine, Diversity and Learning at Harvard: A Historical View, Address to
the Massachusetts Historical Society (Nov. 6, 1996), in RUDENSTINE, supra note 241, at 23.
243. Id. at 24.
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opportunity. Racial discrimination is not entirely a vice of the distant past;
rather “conscious and unconscious race bias, even rank discrimination based
on race, remain alive in our land, impeding realization of our highest values
and ideals.”244 The history of unfair treatment has produced disparities
between the educational attainments and economic status of AfricanAmericans as compared to white Americans.245 These handicaps have
undermined the ability of African-Americans to compete. Racial preference
was seen as a strategy to remedy that history of abuse, to put AfricanAmericans in the position they would have been in absent this history of
mistreatment.246 President Lyndon B. Johnson put it well during his 1965
address at Howard University. He said:
But freedom is not enough. You do not wipe away the scars of centuries
by saying: Now you are free to go where you want, and do as you desire, and
choose the leaders you please.
You do not take a person who, for years, has been hobbled by chains and
liberate him, bring him up to the starting line of a race and then say, “you are
free to compete with all the others,” and still justly believe that you have been
completely fair.
Thus it is not enough just to open the gates of opportunity. All our citizens
must have the ability to walk through those gates.247

Compensatory arguments take race into account in at least four different
contexts. First, they are offered as a reason for awarding relief to a particular
plaintiff who was denied something by a particular defendant based upon race.
This paradigm involves no exceptional remedy; awarding relief to actual
victims should not be seen as race preference. Rather, it simply involves
granting a conventional judicial remedy to redress harm one party has caused
another. Indeed, this variation is not controversial and every justice who has
sat on the Court during the last quarter century (if not longer) would have no
trouble accepting it.248
A second form of race sensitivity arises when a candidate’s race might act
as a surrogate for a set of obstacles overcome. “It is simply not possible to

244. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2347-48 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
245. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 395-96 (1978) (Marshall, J.).
246. See generaly Frank Askin, The Case for Compensatory Treatment, 24 RUTGERS L. REV.
65 (1969).
247. President Lyndon B. Johnson, Address at Howard University, 2 PUB. PAPERS 636 (June
4, 1965).
248. See, e.g., Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 524 (1989) (Scalia, J. concurring)
(supporting a hypothetical order raising the salaries of black employees in response to past
discriminatory conduct); see also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U. S. 200, 239 (1995)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that “[i]ndividuals who have been wronged by unlawful racial
discrimination should be made whole . . . .”).
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understand how individuals have come to be the people they are without
considering the elements that have shaped them,” wrote William G. Bowen in
1977.249 The achievements of a person of color might, in certain instances,
reflect “a degree of drive and determination that should be given weight in the
competition for admission.”250 Such relative judgments might be difficult,
subjective and contested. Yet analytically the principle is not controversial. It
amounts to a judgment that, but for a disadvantage, a particular individual’s
achievement to date would have been sufficient to merit a benefit. It might
also suggest potential for further performance. As such, this form of race
preference is fully consistent with a meritocractic system.
A third type of compensatory argument involves situations where an
institution or class of institutions has been identified as having discriminated
based on race in the past.251 Here, racial preference might extend beyond
victims of that action to others of the same race even though all beneficiaries
might not have been specific victims. This paradigm is also widely supported.
The fourth variation of the compensatory claim is that racial preference is
merited to address societal discrimination even absent a finding of wrongdoing
by the institution in question. This version is controversial. It was at issue in
Bakke where it won the endorsement of four justices,252 but was rejected by

249. WILLIAM G. BOWEN, Admissions and the Relevance of Race, in EVER THE TEACHER:
WILLIAM G. BOWEN’S WRITINGS AS PRESIDENT OF PRINCETON 422, 430 (1988); see also Brief
of Massachusetts Institute of Technology et al. at 23, Grutter, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003) (Nos. 02241, 02-516).
250. See BOWEN, supra note 249, at 430. Justice Douglas took note of this in his dissent in
DeFunis v. Odegaard:
A black applicant who pulled himself out of the ghetto into a junior college may thereby
demonstrate a level of motivation, perseverance, and ability that would lead a fairminded
admissions committee to conclude that he shows more promise for law study than the son
of a rich alumnus who achieved better grades at Harvard. That applicant would be offered
admission not because he is black, but because as an individual he has shown he has the
potential, while the Harvard man may have taken less advantage of the vastly superior
opportunities offered him. Because of the weight of the prior handicaps, that black
applicant may not realize his full potential in the first year of law school, or even in the
full three years, but in the long pull of a legal career his achievements may far outstrip
those of his classmates whose earlier records appeared superior by conventional criteria.
DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 331 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
251. See, e.g., Hopwood v. Texas, 236 F.3d 256, 273 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that the
government can use race preferences to remedy “present effects of past discrimination”); United
States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 167 (1987) (plurality opinion) (explaining that discriminatory
conduct created a justification for race-conscious relief).
252. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 369 (1978) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). According to Justice Brennan:
Properly construed, therefore, our prior cases unequivocally show that a state government
may adopt race-conscious programs if the purpose of such programs is to remove the
disparate racial impact its actions might otherwise have and if there is reason to believe
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Justice Powell in his decisive opinion: “We have never approved a
classification that aids persons perceived as members of relatively victimized
groups at the expense of other innocent individuals in the absence of judicial,
legislative, or administrative findings of constitutional or statutory
violations.”253 Justice Powell’s statement suggested two problems. First,
remedying societal discrimination was “an amorphous concept of injury that
may be ageless in its reach into the past.”254 The rationale involved “sheer
speculation.”255 Second, regardless of the merits of the rationale, universities
could not address it. Their business was education; they were not judicial,
legislative, or administrative institutions.
Accordingly, they were not
competent to make the requisite findings.256 The societal discrimination
rationale has never commanded a majority on the Court. Responding in part
perhaps to prevailing judicial doctrine, leading universities go out of their way
to reject it.257 Michigan did not invoke it in Grutter or Gratz and no justice
wrote an opinion championing it.258
Justice Powell might have pointed out other problems universities would
encounter if the societal discrimination compensatory argument was used as
the basis for race preferences in admissions. Those who suffered most from
such discrimination, and accordingly who would have the strongest claim to
compensation, might not be the best candidates for undergraduate or
professional schools. Committing spaces to such candidates might poorly
allocate precious resources. This objection might be met by limiting race
preference as compensation to those who were very qualified. Such a
limitation, though entirely sensible, would suggest a criteria other than
compensation at work. Moreover, a compensatory approach might not help
many African-Americans. Some African-Americans might have a modest, or
no, claim to compensation based on disadvantage suffered. Some from other
backgrounds might have strong claims to have suffered from economic
that the disparate impact is itself the product of past discrimination, whether its own or
that of society at large. There is no question that Davis’ program is valid under this test.
Id.
253. Id. at 307.
254. Id.
255. Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U. S. 469, 499 (1989) (O’Connor, J.).
256. Bakke, 438 U. S. at 309. Cf. Thomas Nagel, Equal Treatment and Compensatory
Discrimination, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 348, 356-58 (1973) (reform of system of rewards beyond
capacity of educational institutions).
257. See, e.g., Brief of Massachusetts Institute of Technology et al. at 23, Grutter v. Bollinger,
123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003) (Nos. 02-241, 02-516) (“Neither MIT nor Stanford makes admission
decisions to compensate for past wrongs.”).
258. To be sure, Justice Ginsburg pointed out an array of disparities between races related to
past and present discrimination. But her discussion was largely oriented to contending for a
lower level of scrutiny for minority preferences rather than supporting the societal discrimination
rationale. Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2443-45 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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circumstances, prejudice, or other disadvantage.259 Some groups, who might
have suffered from discrimination, might be well-represented at universities
already. The entire enterprise would be fraught with controversy and would
put universities in the business of redistributive justice, an activity far from
their basic mission.
Alternatively, proponents of racial preferences identify certain
instrumental justifications that would promote social well-being outside of the
campus. The common premise of these arguments is that social utility will
increase and the world will be a better place if more African-Americans and
certain other minorities have access to a greater share of society’s resources.
For instance, in Bakke, the University argued that reserving medical school
spots for minorities would improve the delivery of medical care to underserved
minority communities.260 Alternatively, some cite society’s need for more
minorities in leadership positions as a ground for considering race in
admissions.261 Other such instrumental justifications include providing role
models262 and developing an expanded African-American upper middle class
“able to pass its material advantages and elevated aspirations to subsequent
generations.”263
These instrumental justifications for race preferences might seem primarily
oriented to helping African-Americans and other disadvantaged populations.
To be sure, that outcome is consistent with these purposes. Yet many such
rationales benefit the whole community. In some roles, African-Americans
might be more successful than whites. It is plausible to suggest that African259. Excluded from this discussion are disadvantages because of different distributions of
traits and talents that arguably produce the greatest disparity in rewards. See, e.g., Nagel, supra
note 256, at 353-58.
260. See Nagel, supra note 256, at 361 (arguing for race preferences to increase black doctors
on utilitarian grounds). Cf. Karst & Horowitz, supra note 62, at 970 (arguing for race preferences
as a way to improve legal representation for minorities).
261. See, e.g., BOWEN, supra note 249, at 430. For a discussion of the role of universities in
educating office holders, see AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 181-85 (1987).
262. Ronald Dworkin called the role model rationale “a calculation of strategy.” He
explained:
[T]hat increasing the number of blacks who are at work in the professions will, in the long
run, reduce the sense of frustration and injustice and racial self-consciousness in the black
community to the point at which blacks may begin to think of themselves as individuals
who can succeed like others through talent and initiative.
DWORKIN, supra note 107, at 294; Karst & Horowitz, supra note 62, at 970; see also Wygant v.
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 315 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (endorsing the role
model theory in public schools). Others criticize this rationale. See, e.g., Richard Delgado,
Affirmative Action as a Majoritarian Device: Or, Do You Really Want to be a Role Model?, 89
MICH. L. REV. 1222 (1991) (criticizing affirmative action’s reliance on the instrumental rather
than the compensatory rationale); id. at 1226-31 (criticizing the role model rationale).
263. Randall Kennedy, Persuasion and Distrust: A Comment on the Affirmative Action
Debate, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1327, 1329 (1986).
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American police officers might have better rapport in some minority
communities than would an all-white complement. If this interaction translates
into less crime, the entire community benefits.264 Moreover, rudimentary
economic principles suggest communal benefits might flow from some race
preferences. The relative lack of minorities as doctors, lawyers, or chief
executive officers suggests an under-utilization of human resources, which, if
tapped, would better society. Programs that identify and prepare talented
African-Americans for these roles might help society increase overall
productivity by making better use of the pool of human capital. Finally,
success of African-Americans and other disadvantaged minorities is critical to
moving social reality closer to basic American ideals. America’s democratic
character becomes less evident if minorities cannot participate in meaningful
ways in civic life. The American dream is revealed as part fantasy if it only
applies to whites.
The compensatory and instrumental rationales provided part of the
argument for race preferences in the early days. Student body diversity was by
no means the dominant factor. Writing before Bakke was decided, McGeorge
Bundy, then-President of the Ford Foundation, suggested that remedying
societal discrimination was the primary rationale for racial preferences. He
wrote:
Many legitimate purposes have animated those engaged in this effort, but the
deepest and most general objective—toward which any one school or college
can do only a little—has been to ensure full and fair access to all parts of our
social, economic, and professional life for nonwhite Americans. Of course all
kinds of Americans deserve such access, and it is right to remember from the
outset that no past injustice permits us to set any one group above any other.
But there can be no blinking the enormous and unique set of handicaps which
our whole history, right up to the present, has imposed on those who are not
white. It is not the fault of today’s laws or of the present Supreme Court that
racism should be our most destructive inheritance. But that reality makes the
effort to overcome it a matter of the most compelling interest.265

He suggested that “what special admissions, and only special admissions, can
do today is to make access to the learned profession a reality for nonwhites.”266

264. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 314 (Stevens, J. dissenting); Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S.
547, 601-02 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring); see also Kennedy, supra note 263, at 1329 (stating
that affirmative action within police force often leads to improved public safety for everyone).
But see Alexander & Alexander, supra note 43, at 227-29 (criticizing the use of racial criteria in
choosing police officers).
265. McGeorge Bundy, The Issue Before the Court: Who Gets Ahead in America?, THE
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Nov. 1977, at 42; see also DEREK BOK, BEYOND THE IVORY TOWER:
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE MODERN UNIVERSITY, 102-03 (1982).
266. Bundy, supra note 265, at 54.
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Some proponents of racial preference in admissions invoked the
instrumental argument that society needed more blacks in professional and
leadership positions. In 1969, Dean Louis Pollak cited this objective to explain
Yale Law School’s decision to increase its number of African-American
students. He wrote:
For me, a large part of the answer lies in the fact, which we lawyers have only
belatedly realized, that far too few black citizens are being trained for positions
of future leadership. Leadership-training is needed on many fronts, but it
seems particularly clear that the country needs far more—and especially far
more well-trained—black lawyers, bearing in mind that today only 2 or 3
percent of the American bar is black.267

Dean Pollak did not cite student body diversity in his defense.
Similarly, the University of Washington School of Law cited instrumental
rationales for the admissions policy it adopted in December 1973: “[C]ertain
ethnic groups in our society have historically been limited in their access to the
legal profession . . . [that] can affect the quality of legal services available to
members of such groups, as well as limit their opportunity for full participation
in the governance of our communities.”268 The policy made no mention of the
benefits of a diverse student body.
As suggested by the discussions of Dean Pollak and Mr. Bundy, the
remedial and instrumental rationales, not diversity, dominated early discussion
of the merits of race preferences in admissions. Yet clearly, student diversity
was embraced as a desirable goal in and of itself pre-Bakke. In different
contexts, the Court’s prior jurisprudence hinted at the merit of the rationale.269
The Harvard College plan celebrated it.270 Similarly, the Supreme Court of
Washington recognized student body diversity as a compelling state interest in
DeFunis v. Odegaard.271 It said:
The legal profession plays a critical role in the policy making sector of our
society, whether decisions be public or private, state or local. That lawyers, in
making and influencing these decisions, should be cognizant of the views,
needs and demands of all segments of society is a principle beyond dispute.

267. Louis H. Pollak, Dean Pollak Replies, THE PUBLIC INTEREST, Spring 1970, at 50, 51
(letter from Dean Louis Pollak to Hon. Macklin Fleming (June 29, 1969)).
268. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 346-47 (1974) (Appendix to Opinion of Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
269. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-MecKlenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971) (school
authorities could conclude “that in order to prepare students to live in a pluralistic society each
school should have a prescribed ratio of Negro to white students”); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S.
629, 634 (1950) (indicating the need to study law in a context of “interplay of ideas and the
exchange of views with which the law is concerned”); see also O’Neil, supra note 54, at 949.
270. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 316-17 (1978).
271. 507 P.2d 1169, 1184 (Wash. 1973).
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The educational interest of the state in producing a racially balanced student
body at the law school is compelling.272

So, too, did an influential essay that William G. Bowen, then-President of
Princeton University, wrote in 1977.273 Dr. Bowen pointed out that “a great
deal of learning occurs informally” through “interactions” among students
from “different races, religions, and backgrounds.”274 These contacts have
value. He wrote:
Our society—indeed our world—is and will be multiracial. We simply must
learn to work more effectively and more sensitively with individuals of other
races, and a diverse student body can contribute directly to the achievement of
this end. One of the special advantages of a residential college is that it
provides unusually good opportunities to learn about other people and their
perspectives—better opportunities than many will ever know again. If people
of different races are not able to learn together in this kind of setting, and to
learn about each other as they study common subjects, share experiences, and
debate the most fundamental questions, we shall have lost an important
opportunity to contribute to a healthier society—to a society less afflicted by
the failure of too many people to understand and respect one another. 275

In the same essay, Dr. Bowen stressed the instrumental rationale “that our
country needs a far larger number of able people from minority groups in
leadership positions of all kinds.”276 Dr. Bowen rejected “‘proportional
representation’ of different races or ethnic groups in various professions.” But,
he argued, one could oppose that approach yet “still refuse, as I do, to regard as
acceptable the present disparities which are clearly products of generations of
unfair treatment.”277
272. Id. at 1183-84; see also Sandalow, supra note 65, at 684-86 (educational responsibility
of law schools includes exposing law students to diversity of population). But see Richard A.
Posner, The DeFunis Case and the Constitutionality of Preferential Treatment of Racial
Minorities, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 1 (criticizing the diversity rationale).
273. See BOWEN, supra note 249, at 422-36. Dr. Bowen’s article was cited in Justice
Powell’s Bakke opinion. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313 n.48.
274. See BOWEN, supra note 249, at 427.
275. Id. at 429; see also Karst & Horowitz, supra note 62, at 970 (discussing the importance
of bringing “to both the classroom and the profession effective voices representing a culture and a
set of experiences hitherto largely hidden from the majority”).
276. BOWEN, supra note 249, at 430. Samuel Issacharoff offers a contrasting view:
The early rationale for affirmative action . . . was clearly integrationist. Society was
taking responsibility for minorities’ past subordination. Based on this moral authority, a
forward-looking claim emerged about the necessity to improve the status of minorities,
with blacks as the overwhelming case in chief, so as to promote their integration into
mainstream American society. No one seriously claimed that the prime benefit would
come from the improvement of the internal life of the affected institutions.
Samuel Issacharoff, Law and Misdirection in the Debate Over Affirmative Action, 2002 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 11, 23 (2002).
277. BOWEN, supra note 249, at 430-31.
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Dr. Bowen’s double-barreled attack was imitated by others. In an amicus
brief in Bakke, four leading universities identified two problems from the fact
that their student bodies were “overwhelmingly white.” First, by not enrolling
significant numbers of minority students, they “were continuing to deny
intellectual house room to a broad spectrum of diverse cultural insights,
thereby perpetuating a sort of white myopia among students and faculty in
many academic disciplines.”278 Second, they were doing “next to nothing to
enlarge the minute minority fraction . . . of the pool of persons with doctorallevel graduate and professional training” from which universities drew faculty
“and also the pool from which, increasingly, local and national leaders in the
public and private sectors tend to be selected.”279 “[M]aking conscious
efforts” to include minority students helped universities discharge their
“function of providing tomorrow’s leaders in all walks of life.”280 The brief
presumed the desirability of “increasing the number of minority doctors,
judges, corporate executives, university faculty members and government
officials,” an objective that would not occur unless qualified minority students
were given educational opportunity.281
Bakke shifted the terms of the discussion. Justice Powell embraced the
student body diversity rationale while either rejecting, or expressing
reservations about, the other justifications. Reducing the “historic deficit” of
minorities in professions was objectionable, at least if tied to “some specified
percentage.”282 Countering the “effects of ‘societal discrimination’” required
identified wrongdoing as found by an authoritative governmental body.283
Justice Powell rejected the instrumental goal of fostering more equitable health
care delivery because the University had failed to present sufficient evidence
that its program would promote that goal.284 Although Bakke did not
categorically reject instrumental rationales, it did not embrace them. Instead, it
adopted a narrow conception of diversity grounded in First Amendment values
and focused on the value diversity added to campus life. Subsequent cases did
little to encourage instrumental arguments. For instance, the Court criticized
the role model theory in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education as lacking a
“logical stopping point.”285 Moreover, the idea threatened a return to

278. Brief of Columbia University et al. at 3, Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265 (1978) (No. 76-811).
279. Id.
280. Id. at 8.
281. Id.
282. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 305, 307.
283. Id. at 307.
284. Id. at 310-11. But see DeFunis v. Odegaard, 507 P.2d 1169, 1184 (Wash. 1973)
(recognizing the shortage of minority attorneys as a compelling interest).
285. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 275 (1986).
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segregated schools if “[c]arried to its logical extreme.”286 Justice O’Connor
argued that Justice Powell in Bakke had “decisively rejected” the “desire to
have more black medical students or doctors” as discriminatory; the desire to
increase professional classes of African-Americans was unconstitutional.287
Accordingly, Justice Powell’s student diversity rationale emerged as the only
possible justification for race preference in admissions programs, although the
justification was controversial.288 Justice O’Connor seemed to endorse some
notion of racial diversity as “compelling,” at least in the case of higher
education.289 But she had rejected diversity in other contexts and had
suggested that remedying past discrimination was the only compelling interest
the Court had accepted.290 Diversity was “simply too amorphous, too
insubstantial, and too unrelated to any legitimate basis for employing racial
classifications.”291
Following Bakke, many universities designed their admissions programs to
fit within the boundaries Justice Powell drew.292 To be sure, Justice Powell’s
campus-focused diversity rationale had some genuine merit. Students learn
more in heterogeneous communities than when exposed solely to those from
The diversity rationale also introduced race
similar backgrounds.293
preferences into a strategy to which universities have been committed for
decades. Selective universities do not simply admit those students with the
most robust grade point averages and standardized scores. They measure
applicants based upon a range of qualities as well as against the strengths and
weaknesses of the rest of the class. They look for the violinist, the journalist,
286. Id. at 276; see also id. at 288-89, 288 n.1 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (criticizing the role
model “racial diversity” rationale).
287. Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 496 (1989) (“The desire to have more black
medical students or doctors, standing alone, was not merely insufficiently compelling to justify a
racial classification, it was ‘discrimination for its own sake,’ forbidden by the Constitution.”).
288. See, e.g., Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234, 1245-50 (11th Cir.
2001) (Powell’s opinion not binding precedent); Hopwood v. Texas, 236 F.3d 256, 274-75, 275
n.66 (5th Cir. 2000) (same); Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944 (5th Cir. 1996) (same). But see
Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law Sch., 233 F.3d 1188, 1198-1201 (9th Cir. 2000) (Powell’s Bakke
opinion constitutes law).
289. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 286 (1986).
290. Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 612 (1995).
291. Id. (stating that broadcast diversity is “clearly not a compelling interest.”). But see Amar
& Katyal, supra note 121, at 1761-68 (arguing that Justice O’Connor’s opinion did not repudiate
Bakke, but only repudiated an extension of the principle beyond the educational context and
distinguishing the troublesome features of affirmative action identified by O’Connor).
292. See, e.g., Brief of Amherst College et al. at 27, Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325
(2003) (Nos. 02-241, 02-516) (indicating that twenty-eight signatory small colleges and
universities fashioned policies based on Justice Powell’s opinion); Brief of Judith Areen et al. at
12-13, Grutter, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (Nos. 02-241, 02-516) (ten leading law schools base the school’s
admission program on Justice Powell’s opinion).
293. See generally BOWEN & BOK, supra note 241.
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the poet, the shortstop. They also look for students from different
backgrounds, places, and walks of life. When one accepts the virtue of a
campus that includes students with varied qualities and characteristics, as have
selective American universities for some time, adding race to the mix
represents a new variation on an old theme. To be sure, preferring a student
based on race raises some concerns not present when simply looking for a
high-jumper or percussionist. Whether these issues can be mitigated depends
in part on the design and implementation of the preference. The point here is
simply that the diversity rationale reflects a variation on a long-standing
commitment of universities.
Moreover, the diversity rationale introduced a new argument that made
racial preferences more palatable. The compensatory rationale imagined a
zero-sum game with winners and losers fighting over the same scarce
resources. Its nomenclature was divisive. It conceived the relevant universe as
consisting of wrongdoers (or their progeny) and victims. The diversity
rationale transformed the debate by broadening the beneficiaries. To be sure,
African-Americans and other minorities benefit. Exposure to whites on a
diverse campus is valuable,294 especially to those minorities who seek to
achieve high levels of influence and accordingly must fare well in
environments that whites dominate. Yet the diversity rationale helps whites,
too.295 The exposure to racial and ethnic minorities enhances their education,
exposing them to new insights and providing experience in interacting in an
interracial context that will help them succeed. Because more whites attend
selective schools than do blacks, on one measure at least, whites arguably
benefit more from diversity than do minorities: “While the minority students
would benefit incidentally from such a program, the primary beneficiaries
would be the institution and the students whose educational experience would
be enriched by contact with a broader segment of society.”296 Indeed, evidence
suggests that students of all races appreciate the contribution diversity makes
to their education.297 Everyone is a winner (except perhaps for the isolated
whites who lose spots to preferred minorities).
Moreover, the diversity rationale mitigated the stigma attached to raceconscious admissions.
Under its logic, African-Americans and other
minorities were contributors to, not just beneficiaries of, campus life. They
294. Id. at 222.
295. Cf. Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 568 (1990) (discussing how broadcast
diversity redounds to society at large). In this respect, there is an inescapable irony in the
diversity rationale. It was once claimed that integrated schools would help black students learn
better by exposing them to more academically advanced white peers. The diversity rationale
inverted that standard argument. It suggests that white students will learn better if they are
exposed to minority students.
296. O’Neil, supra note 54, at 949.
297. BOWEN & BOK, supra note 241, at 218-55.
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were being admitted because they brought something to the campus that it
needed. The experiences associated with being black in America were a
valued credential, just as having a reliable jump-shot or being from Wyoming
or an alumni child were all valued credentials. Recognizing the multitude of
such factors, as the Harvard College plan did, diminished the stigma attached
to race.
Finally, the diversity rationale accorded universities the greatest latitude
when acting within their expertise. Universities are most competent to make
judgments regarding how to define, and deliver, education. Accordingly, if
universities believe that campus diversity has pedagogical value, as most have
argued, that conclusion deserves some respect. They are less competent,
however, at determining who society has harmed and who should be sacrificed
to compensate those deemed disadvantaged.
Yet diversity, as Justice Powell conceived it, had some clear drawbacks.
Justice Powell’s diversity rationale deviated from the initial purpose behind
race preferences. Affirmative action was initially part of the remedy to give
African-Americans a fair shake. It gave a benefit to African-Americans to
undo the burden that American history had imposed and to allow them to
participate in the American dream.298 Justice Powell’s diversity rationale had
an entirely different focus. It justified racial preference, not as a means to help
disadvantaged minorities, but as a strategy to allow universities to enhance
educational quality.299 It might be, as some suggest, that African-Americans
historically have only been able to advance when their interests coincide with
those of the larger community or at least some powerful faction of it.300 Yet it
was somewhat perverse to deny that race-conscious admissions served
instrumental rationales related to race and to instead treat educational quality
as the only articulated rationale, as it was in Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke.
Alternatively, some contended that diversity was merely an argument of
convenience, not the real rationale.301
Moreover, diversity might not be the best rationale to advance AfricanAmericans. Diversity might broaden the class of preferred candidates.302 The
298. See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427, 471 (1997) (“The
purpose of affirmative action is to bring into our nation’s institutions more blacks, more
Hispanics, more Native Americans, more women, sometimes more Asians, and so on—
period. . . . In fact, the true, core objective of race-based affirmative action is nothing other than
helping blacks.”).
299. See, e.g., O’Neil, supra note 54, at 949.
300. See, e.g., Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the InterestConvergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980).
301. See, e.g., Rubenfeld, supra note 298, at 471; Peter H. Schuck, Affirmative Action: Past,
Present and Future, 20 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 34 (2002).
302. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, A Rational Basis for Affirmative Action: A Shaky But
Classical Liberal Defense, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2036, 2040 (2002) (stating that “diversity is a trope
that may sweep too broadly, for it allows, indeed requires, the accommodation of all minority

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

944

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 48:899

child of Appalachia or of immigrant farm workers, the new immigrant from
Iran or Russia, and the Alaskan Eskimo might all diversify a campus. To the
extent these and other groups claim “diversity” spots, those available for
African-American candidates will be diminished. Yet diversity, as Justice
Powell justified it, would seem to value potential contributions of candidates
from these groups no less than those of African-Americans.
B.

Grutter’s Justification of Race Preferences

Notwithstanding these problems associated with the diversity rationale,
Bakke left it the only available justification of a race-conscious admissions
program at a university not guilty of past discrimination. Indeed, parties shied
away from invoking other justifications. The societal discrimination rationale
clearly could not command a majority. In Grutter, representatives of the Law
School were quick to deny any remedial intent. The School’s policy spoke of
its “commitment to racial and ethnic diversity with special reference to the
inclusion of students from groups which have been historically discriminated
against.”303 Justice O’Connor reported that the drafter “explained that this
language did not purport to remedy past discrimination, but rather to include
students who may bring to the Law School a perspective different from that of
members of groups which have not been the victims of such discrimination.”304
Michigan’s brief focused entirely on arguing that student body diversity was a
compelling state interest, that Bakke recognized such a rationale, and that
Michigan’s plan was narrowly tailored to fit it. Michigan did not attempt to
persuade the Court of arguments it had previously rejected. Instead, it
hammered at the benefits of student diversity.
At a superficial level, the Court in Grutter simply adopted Justice Powell’s
student diversity rationale. Justice O’Connor made a point of noting that
Michigan Law School, before the Court and throughout the litigation,
“assert[ed] only one justification for their use of race in the admissions
process,” that rationale being the diversity justification.305 The Court claimed
that the narrowly tailored compelling interest that justified a racial
classification was “‘the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student

groups, not just blacks who have nationwide suffered the stain of slavery and past
discrimination”).
303. Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2334 (2003) (internal quotations omitted).
304. Id.
305. Id. at 2338. The Court quoted Michigan as resting on “‘the educational benefits that
flow from a diverse student body.’” Id. (quoting Brief for Respondent at i, Grutter, 123 S. Ct.
2325 (No. 02-241)). In fact, Michigan added the words “to an institution of higher education, its
students, and the public it serves.” Brief for Respondent at i, Grutter, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (No. 02241).
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body.’”306 That rationale suggested that a diverse student body fostered high
quality education, that students can best learn to address a multicultural society
and world if they learn and gain experience on campuses consisting of students
from different racial and ethnic backgrounds. Thus, in Bakke, Justice Powell
observed that medical students, who might one day “serve a heterogeneous
population,” would benefit from exposure in graduate school to students from
different backgrounds.307 In Grutter, Justice O’Connor found “substantial”
educational benefits flow from diversity.
These include cross-racial
understanding that erodes racial stereotypes, richer classroom discussion, and
better preparation for participating in a diverse workforce.308
In fact, Grutter went well beyond Justice Powell’s Bakke opinion in the
rationales it recognized for race preferences. While repeatedly sounding the
student diversity chord, Justice O’Connor signaled her novel approach in
several ways.
First, although she discussed Bakke extensively, she specifically avoided
treating it as binding precedent. Instead, the Court simply endorsed Justice
Powell’s view that student body diversity was “a compelling state interest that
can justify the use of race in university admissions.”309 In declining to give
Bakke stare decisis effect, the Court avoided a main argument Michigan’s Law
School made. Indeed, the Law School began its brief by stating the “essential
holding”310 of Bakke that “a University may consider race in admissions”311
and claiming that “Settled Principles of Stare Decisis Strongly Counsel
Against Overruling Bakke.”312 Michigan Law School spent three pages
applying the criteria for stare decisis from the Casey plurality opinion.
Although Justice O’Connor and Justice Souter were two of the three co-authors
of the Casey plurality, they elected not to analyze the problem in that mode.
Second, Justice O’Connor muted Justice Powell’s reliance on the First
Amendment. The First Amendment had allowed Justice Powell to affirm the
use of race in admissions decisions without basing his opinion on the need to
address America’s race problems. Justice Powell explicitly grounded student
body diversity in the protection the First Amendment gave universities to make
judgments regarding academic and pedagogic matters. Justice O’Connor’s
reliance on the First Amendment was softened and ambiguous. She attributed
every reference to the First Amendment or free speech to Justice Powell or
306. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2338 (quoting Brief for Respondent at i, Grutter, 123 S. Ct. 2325
(No. 02-241)); see also id. at 2329 (noting the “educational benefits that diversity is designed to
produce”); id. at 2341 (noting the “educational benefits of a diverse student body”).
307. Regents of Univ. of Ca. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 314 (1978).
308. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2339-40.
309. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2337.
310. Brief for Respondent at 12, Grutter, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (No. 02-241).
311. Id. at 15.
312. Id. at 17.
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earlier Court decisions rather than asserting the connection herself. And she
rested her conclusion that Michigan had a compelling state interest in student
body diversity on a belief that the rationale was “at the heart of the Law
School’s proper institutional mission” and the school’s good faith should be
presumed.313 To be sure, she did not reject the First Amendment as a basis for
her conclusion, but she hardly trumpeted it either.
Finally, whereas Justice Powell’s discussion focused almost entirely on the
impact of diversity on the campus, Justice O’Connor saw the payoff as
occurring primarily after graduation. Justice Powell made only one comment
regarding the post-campus benefits of student body diversity, acknowledging,
almost in passing, that exposure to a diverse student body might “better equip”
future doctors “to render with understanding their vital service to humanity.”314
Justice O’Connor devoted pages to the topic.315 She accepted the
argument of “major American businesses” that America’s economic wellbeing was related to diversity: “[T]he skills needed in today’s increasingly
global marketplace can only be developed through exposure to widely diverse
people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints.”316 This argument resembled in some
respects Justice Powell’s passing reference to the benefits of campus diversity
on post-campus life. But whereas that single reference represented the furthest
Justice Powell strayed from campus, this justification represented Justice
O’Connor’s most modest argument and one to which she devoted barely more
than a sentence.317
The Grutter Court implicitly relied on other justifications that went well
beyond those that Justice Powell identified as well. Student body diversity was
not simply a strategy to promote the robust exchange of ideas and learning on
campus and to expose college and graduate students to a heterogeneous peer
group. The Court also saw it as a way to educate more African-Americans and
other disadvantaged minorities. The Court thought this rationale important for
several reasons.
First, the Court tied race-sensitive admissions to national security. An
amicus brief by an impressive list of military leaders argued that raceconscious admissions programs were necessary to protect national security, the
most compelling state interest.318 National security depended on a “cohesive
military” that required “a diverse officer corps and substantial numbers of
officers educated and trained in diverse educational settings, including the

313. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2339.
314. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 314 (1978).
315. See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2339-41.
316. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2340.
317. Id.
318. Brief of Lt. Gen. Julius W. Becton, Jr. et al. at 7, Grutter, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (Nos. 02-241,
02-516).
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military academics and ROTC programs.”319 The brief sounded two of the
rationales for race-conscious admissions—the benefits of training in a diverse
environment and the instrumental need for minority officers. The latter was
clearly the dominant theme. The brief focused on the need to attract minority
officers,320 with the pedagogical benefits of a diverse student body a much
fainter theme.321 Racial preferences thus were not simply a strategy to provide
a rich campus experience in which students broadened their horizons; they also
were a means to develop a potential officer pool including racial minorities.
Justice O’Connor, in effect, accepted the need to recruit and train more
minority officers to serve our country. In Bakke, Justice Powell had rejected as
a per se violation the University’s desire to increase the number of minority
medical students and minority physicians. Military leaders made clear the
military’s reliance on rather specific minority admissions goals at the various
military academies.322 For instance, West Point set “specific percentage goals
for minorities” based upon their representation in the population, collegebound pool, and army.323 The naval academy used specified goals and targets
for minorities.324 Justice O’Connor saw no problem. Whereas the University
of California-Davis’s instrumental goal of attracting minority doctors to serve
minority communities was not sufficiently tailored to the end advanced, racial
preferences were judged necessary to produce the required diverse officer
corps.325 The reliance on the military argument signaled that First Amendment
values relating to campus diversity were not all that drove the Court. If
campus diversity was all that mattered, as Justice Powell suggested, the
military arguments would have been totally irrelevant under the circumstances.
Justice O’Connor’s reliance on them indicated that she viewed diversity in far
broader terms.

319. Id. at 8; see also id. at 27. The brief pointed out that eighty-one percent of active duty
officers were white as compared to 8.8% African-American, four percent Hispanic, 3.2% AsianAmerican, and .6% Native American. Id. at 7. These figures for officers compared to those
enlisted in active duty forces, of which 61.7% were white, 21.7% African-American, 9.6%
Hispanic, 1.2% Native American, four percent Asian-American, and 1.8% others. Id. at 12.
320. See, e.g., id. at 17-18 (calling the “integration of the officer corps a military necessity;”
stating that equal opportunity is indispensable to cohesiveness; demonstrating a link between
minority officers and military effectiveness; explaining the need to increase percentage of
minority officers; stating that service academics and ROTC use limited race-conscious policies to
expand the number of minority officers, and that integration of officer corps is essential to reduce
race turmoil in the military).
321. Id. at 28 (stating that diversity at military academies and ROTC provides leaders of
forces with experience to lead forces with forty percent minority members).
322. Id. at 18-27.
323. Brief of Lt. Gen. Julius W. Becton, Jr. et al. at 19, Grutter, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (Nos. 02-241,
02-516).
324. Id. at 20-21.
325. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2340.
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The military rationale has been dismissed as a cynical effort to attract and
motivate African-American soldiers to shoulder disproportionate responsibility
for fighting America’s wars.326 That interpretation might have a measure of
truth. Yet when the military discussion is restored to the context of the
opinion, it merits a more benevolent spin. The Court did not discuss military
leadership alone. Rather, it located it as one aspect of a larger problem. The
Court also justified racial preference at law schools, particularly selective ones,
because they would help develop a cadre of African-American leaders. It
observed that a high percentage of national leaders have law degrees, many
from selective law schools. “Access to legal education (and thus the legal
profession) must be inclusive of talented and qualified individuals of every
race and ethnicity, so that all members of our heterogeneous society may
participate in the educational institutions that provide the training and
education necessary to succeed in America.”327
Justice O’Connor also justified racial preferences as necessary to promote
important civic aspirations: “Effective participation by members of all racial
and ethnic groups in the civic life of our Nation is essential if the dream of one
Nation, indivisible, is to be realized.”328 Justice O’Connor set up this punch
line by quoting the government’s amicus brief affirming the “paramount
government objective” to ensure “that public institutions are open and
available to all segments of American society, including people of all races and
ethnicities.”329 This reliance on the government was ironic because it
supported Grutter’s position and the thrust of its brief expressed little sympathy
for the Law School’s plan. Good citizenship depended on education.
Accordingly, “the diffusion of knowledge and opportunity through public
institutions of higher education must be accessible to all individuals regardless
of race or ethnicity.”330 Yet the Court’s stated purpose was not simply to teach
minorities how to be patriotic citizens. It was also to make the American
dream their reality. “Access to legal education” had to cross racial lines so that
minorities could “succeed in America,”331 an idea that came from Brown.332
Thus, the Michigan Law School plan served not only the immediate goal of
creating a diverse campus, but also the long-term instrumental goal of
perfecting American society and democracy by promoting participation of
African-Americans “in the civic life of our Nation.”333
326. See William Nelson, Brown v. Board of Education and the Jurisprudence of Legal
Realism, 48 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 834 (2004).
327. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2341.
328. Id. at 2340-41.
329. Id. at 2340.
330. Id.
331. Id. at 2341.
332. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
333. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2340.
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The Court also saw race-sensitive admissions as a way to preserve the
legitimacy of important societal institutions. Justice O’Connor wrote:
In order to cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry,
it is necessary that the path to leadership be visibly open to talented and
qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity. All members of our
heterogeneous society must have confidence in the openness and integrity of
the educational institutions that provide this training.334

Although the court did not attribute this idea, it closely resembled a passage in
the military brief.335
Finally, the Court saw race-sensitive admissions as a way to combat
stereotypes that disparage minorities. The Law School’s desire for a critical
mass of minority students was not premised on the belief that minorities would
“‘express some characteristic minority viewpoint on any issue.’”336 On the
contrary, race-sensitive admissions were designed to enroll a critical mass in
order to burst such stereotypes. The “unique experience of being a racial
minority in a society, like our own, in which race unfortunately still matters”
would contribute to learning, the Court proclaimed.337
The rationales Justice O’Connor articulated for race-sensitive admissions
were certainly not novel. They had been suggested for years in various
contexts. What made her opinion noteworthy was the distance she traveled
beyond Justice Powell in justifying race preferences. Rather than adhering to
Justice Powell’s narrow version of diversity, Justice O’ Connor viewed
diversity as a broader concept that incorporated some of the very instrumental
rationales that Justice Powell had rejected.
C. Influences Behind the Expanded Rationale: Some Speculations
How did this happen? One can only speculate. I cannot prove that any of
the briefs or prior opinions swayed Justice O’Connor’s thinking, but it is
interesting to note the overlap between some of them and her opinion.
Michigan School of Law was constrained by Bakke and did not ask the
court to accept justifications it had previously rejected. Yet it exploited
opportunities to sneak other themes into its student diversity argument. For
334. Id. at 2341.
335. Brief of Lt. Gen. Julius W. Becton, Jr. et al. at 9, Grutter, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (Nos. 02-241,
02-516).
336. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2341 (quoting Brief for Respondent at 30, Grutter, 123 S. Ct. 2325
(No. 02-241)). Such a view would have run afoul of Justice O’Connor’s prior expressions. See,
e.g., Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 602 (1990) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“the
Constitution provides that the Government may not allocate benefits and burdens among
individuals based on the assumption that race or ethnicity determines how they act or think”); see
also Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 946 (5th Cir. 1996) (“To believe that a person’s race
controls his point of view is to stereotype him.”).
337. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2341.
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instance, in arguing that Bakke was precedent that should not be overruled,
Michigan suggested that abandoning Bakke would damage the stability of
society by making state schools white enclaves. Michigan stated that:
[A] decision to overrule Bakke would cut the minority lawyers currently being
trained by half or three-quarters, resulting in the near-complete absence of
minority students from the schools that train most of our federal judges,
prosecutors and law clerks (to say nothing of the new lawyers at our country’s
leading law firms).338

Michigan’s argument did not persuade the Court of its asserted purpose—to
apply Bakke as binding precedent. Still, the Court made similar arguments that
race-sensitive admissions were necessary to furnish society’s need for AfricanAmerican leaders and lawyers.339
Michigan’s stability of society argument helped shape Justice O’Connor’s
opinion in a second respect independent of its asserted intent. Justice
O’Connor argued that only racially diverse institutions would be seen as
legitimate by the entire citizenry. Michigan made this argument in insisting
that Bakke not be overruled:
As our country becomes increasingly racially diverse, the public confidence in
law enforcement and legal institutions so essential to the coherence and
stability of our society will be difficult to maintain if the segments of the bench
and bar currently filled by graduates of those institutions again become a
preserve for white graduates, trained in isolation from the communities they
will serve.340

Michigan’s argument was close to the formulation Justice O’Connor adopted,
but not as close as a passage from the military brief: “Broad access to the
education that leads to leadership roles is essential to public confidence in the
fairness and integrity of public institutions, and their ability to perform their
vital functions and missions.”341
Finally, Michigan’s arguments concerning stereotyping apparently
connected with Justice O’Connor. She had previously related race preferences
to impermissible stereotypes.342 Michigan devoted pages of its brief to
addressing Justice O’Connor’s specific articulated concerns. It wrote in part:

338. Brief for Respondent at 20, Grutter, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (No. 02-241).
339. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2341.
340. Brief for Respondent at 20-21, Grutter, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (No. 02-241).
341. Brief of Lt. Gen. Julius W. Becton, Jr. et al. at 9, Grutter, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (Nos. 02-241,
02-516).
342. See, e.g., Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 602 (1990) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)
(stating that “the Constitution provides that the Government may not allocate benefits and
burdens among individuals based on the assumption that race or ethnicity determines how they
think.”); id. at 618 (opposing the equation of race with “belief and behavior”).
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The Law School does not premise its need for a racially integrated student
body on any belief that minority students always (or even consistently) express
some characteristic minority viewpoint on any issue. To the contrary, breaking
down such stereotypes is a crucial part of its mission, and one that cannot be
advanced with only token numbers of minority students. The Law School
values the presence of minority students because they will have direct,
personal experiences that white students cannot—experiences which are
relevant to the Law School’s mission.343

The Court quoted part of this language.344 Moreover, Michigan’s distinction
between “the fiction that race determines a person’s ‘belief and behavior’” and
“the inescapable reality that race affects life experiences in our society”345
apparently resonated with Justice O’Connor who acknowledged that the
“unique experience of being a racial minority” would likely affect views.346
Justice O’Connor did cite Justice Powell’s Bakke opinion at length in
Grutter. Yet it was by no means the only text that influenced her opinion. As
shown above, arguments from a small set of briefs also found their way into
the Court’s opinion and expanded the dimensions of the student diversity
rationale.
Ultimately, Justice O’Connor’s opinion also reflected a more surprising
influence—the opinion of Justice Marshall in Bakke. To be sure, Grutter did
not come out as he would have written it. Most significantly, the societal
discrimination rationale that he advanced received no sympathetic hearing
from Justice O’Connor. Yet other strands of his argument did find their way
into her opinion.
The vision of an open and inclusive society was central to her thinking; she
devoted several paragraphs of her Grutter opinion to this theme: “Effective
participation by members of all racial and ethnic groups in the civic life of our
Nation is essential if the dream of one Nation, indivisible, is to be realized.”347
This idea echoed from Justice Marshall’s opinion. He complained that
America excluded Negroes. Thus “meaningful equality remains a distant
dream for the Negro.”348 According to Justice Marshall, “[t]he dream of
America as the great melting pot has not been realized for the Negro; because
of his skin color he never even made it into the pot.”349 Therefore, “bringing

343. Brief for Respondent at 30, Grutter, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (No. 02-241) (citation omitted).
344. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2341.
345. Brief for Respondent at 30, Grutter, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (No. 02-241).
346. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2341. It might have helped that Michigan quoted Justice
O’Connor’s observation that “‘[L]ike race, gender matters’ in one’s ‘resulting life
experience[s].’” Brief for Respondent at 31, Grutter, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (No. 02-241) (quoting
J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 148-49 (1994)).
347. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2340-41.
348. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 395 (1978).
349. Id. at 400-01.
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the Negro into the mainstream of American life should be a state interest of the
highest order. To fail to do so is to ensure that America will forever remain a
divided society.”350 The “doors” to positions had been closed to Negroes; “[i]f
we are ever to become a fully integrated society” steps must be taken “to open
those doors.”351 Justice O’Connor used similar rhetoric and metaphors.352
Justice O’Connor’s opinion borrowed a few themes from an older work in
which Thurgood Marshall also played a part, Brown v. Board of Education. Its
two principal ideas echoed in her opinion. She, too, saw education as “‘the
very foundation of good citizenship’”353 and as the ticket to participate in the
American dream. And, if she did not display Chief Justice Warren’s
communitarian idea as fully as she might have, her opinion embraced the
vision of a racially inclusive society that was Brown’s own contribution.
D. The Significance of Grutter’s Broadened Rationale
Justice O’Connor’s Grutter opinion provided a more complete and
convincing defense of race preferences in university admissions than had
Bakke a quarter century earlier. She did not abandon the notion of campus
diversity. Yet, her approach mitigated some of the problems with the diversity
rationale by expanding it beyond the narrow parameters Justice Powell drew.
She recognized that a diverse student body was not simply a means to foster a
robust campus experience or even to prepare people to work well in a
multicultural and multiracial workforce. For Justice O’Connor, race was not a
relevant factor of diversity simply because it shaped experiences and
accordingly contributed to campus life; it also was included because of a need
to increase participation of African-Americans in civic life. It was an
instrumental means to build a better society—increasing the number of
African-Americans in leadership positions, enhancing the legitimacy of social
institutions, combating stereotypes, improving civic participation, and
ultimately making the American dream a reality. Finally, race preferences, for
Justice O’Connor, were not primarily to benefit whites by enriching their

350. Id. at 396.
351. Id. at 401-02.
352. It is perhaps noteworthy that Justice O’Connor included a short sketch of Justice
Marshall in her recent memoir:
No one could help but be moved by Justice Thurgood Marshall’s spirit. No one could
avoid being touched by his soul. . . . Occasionally, at conference meetings, I still catch
myself looking expectantly for his raised brow and his twinkling eye, hoping to hear, just
once more, another story that would, by and by, perhaps change the way I see the world.
SANDRA DAY O’CONNOR, THE MAJESTY OF THE LAW: REFLECTIONS OF A SUPREME COURT
JUSTICE 138 (2003).
353. Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2340 (2003) (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347
U.S. 483, 493 (1954)).
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education. They served that purpose, but also were a way to allow AfricanAmericans a more complete opportunity to participate in American life.
In addition to providing a more persuasive defense of race preferences in
admissions, Justice O’Connor’s opinion contributed in a second critical way.
Her opinion, and the sources it cited, demonstrated that race-sensitive
admissions plans represent a consensus approach of a broad spectrum of
American society. Those who endorsed approaches, like that at issue in
Grutter, were not simply a predictable collection of civil rights groups with a
perceived stake in the outcome. They included, too, bastions of the American
establishment—major universities, Fortune 500 corporations, and the armed
services. That such institutions also identified their interests as inextricably
linked to race-sensitive admissions underscored the importance of these
programs.
VI. CONCLUSION
To be sure, Grutter’s long-term impact is uncertain. For the immediate
future, it threw a strong life-line to university admissions programs using racial
preferences to produce a diverse student body. In articulating the rationale, the
Court channeled the universities’ use of race-sensitive criteria in areas that
coincided with their basic mission. The opinion’s undercurrents suggest a
broader rationale—to open channels whereby more minorities can participate
in leadership positions in society, to help America make the American dream a
reality for all. These rationales—diversity and instrumental—are forwardlooking and designed to improve social utility. They license universities
particularly within their areas of special expertise. They allow universities to
serve societal needs without impairing their basic mission.
It is not at all clear what, if any, impact the decision will have beyond
college and graduate admissions. The instrumental rationales are tied to
diversity. Thus, Grutter might be limited to applications where a diverse
population provides either the specific benefits Justice O’Connor identifies or
at least some gain related to education. And Grutter’s future might turn, in
part, on the fortuity of judicial retirements and appointments. Who will retire
first and when? Will affirmative action become a litmus test for Supreme
Court nominees?
Moreover, without ignoring the positive impact of programs of racesensitive admissions at colleges and universities, we should not overstate their
impact. To be sure, they have conferred clear benefits, but they are by no
means a full solution to racial disparities that afflict our country. After all,
they afford benefits to a relatively select portion of the minority population.
They offer no relief to those who do not apply to college or graduate school. It
is difficult to see such efforts ameliorating racial disparities absent
commitment to redressing the gaps that exist in K–12 education. In many
urban areas, African-American children attend inferior schools in
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circumstances that make learning difficult. Race-sensitive admissions are
simply one approach to affording opportunity. Clearly, additional strategies
must exist to address other racial disparities.
Nevertheless, Grutter represents a judicial reaffirmation of the
constitutional ideal of a racially open society. We might lament that fifty years
after Brown that vision remains a challenge for the future rather than an
accomplishment of the past.
On the other hand, Grutter’s renewed
commitment to that vision of a racially diverse society provides something to
celebrate on this fiftieth anniversary of Brown.

